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On 9 October 2016, a group of Rohingya militants, equipped with machetes, attacked 
police stations in northern Rakhine State (nRS), one of the most impoverished states in 
Myanmar, looting and killing nine police officers and injuring another five. In turn, military and 
police targeted and attacked Rohingya armed groups, killing many innocent civilians. On 24 
March 2017, the European Union, supported by the United States, the United Kingdom and 
other countries, sponsored a United Nations resolution which gives effect to a UN fact-
finding mission to determine the facts on violations, especially in Rakhine State. With a view 
to challenging conventional explanations and views of United Nations-mandated fact-finding, 
this research study operationalizes a dynamic view of UN fact-finding.  
At first blush, a strong case can be made that these relatively extensively 
researched, and verified, across-case dynamics and processes arguably underlie the 
establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar. However, structural 
explanations, like the gridlock in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), do not 
adequately take into account the timing of the establishment of this United Nations-
mandated fact-finding mission. The tatmadaw‟s military operations have for many years 
been seen to involve systematic violations of human rights. Crimes such as arbitrary arrest, 
torture, or forced labour already featured centrally in the work on Myanmar by human rights 
organizations in the 1980s, and these and many other apparent human rights violations, to a 
certain extent, continue to preoccupy the United Nations.  
Furthermore, not only do structural explanations fail to take sufficient account of the 
dynamic interplay between domestic and international fact-finding and the strategic context 
in which they are established, but how the UN mission ‗reflects‘ the complexity of Myanmar‘s 
strategic context, characterised by the emergence and contestation of two audiences of 
legitimation. In this regard, this research study brings together two branches of scholarly 
literature‘ and focuses on the politics of the ‗here and now‘ and the contingencies of within-
case dynamics that underlie the establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to 
Myanmar. In this regard, structural explanations cannot fully account for how the UN-mission 
went from constituting an implicit challenge to the so-called ‗Annan Commission‘ to being 
framed as ‗complementary‘ to the Annan Commission.      
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Bringing together two bodies of scholarly literature, this research study highlights how 
four factors in Myanmar‘s strategic context were key to the establishment of the UN-mission, 
namely, 1. increasing international debate and division over the ‗authority‘ of Aung San Suu 
Kyi; 2. a political shift within the UN headquarters towards an activist role; and 3. a critique of 
the United Nations‘ (UN) dominant approach in Myanmar, which has triggered a fourth, 
namely, 4. the contestation over the identity of the ‗audiences of legitimation.‘ This is most 
aptly illustrated by the establishment of the UN-mandate fact-finding mission to Myanmar, 
which ‗reflects‘ the complexity of Myanmar‘s strategic context, characterised by the 
contestation, navigation and co-optation of these now competing sources of legitimacy: the 
politics of personality and the politics of Rohingya victimhood.   
With a view to operationalizing Frederic Megret‘s (2016) ‗dynamic‘ view or 
conceptualization of international human rights fact-finding, it is argued that the 
establishment of the UN fact-finding mission to Myanmar is to be understood primarily in the 
context of the contested nature of the identity of ‗audiences of legitimation‘. Furthermore, this 
research study employs a process-tracing research methodology, looking to critical historical 
junctures where explanations challenge conventional wisdom of the literature,  for example, 
that the UN-mandated fact-finding mission is intended to (only) discover the ‗truth about the 
past‘ or conceptualization of fact-finding that conflate what is ‗factual‘ with ‗the law‘ or 
presuppose a ‗fact-law distinction‘. Rather, United Nations-mandated fact-finding is a form of 
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On 9 October 2016, a group of Rohingya militants, equipped with machetes, attacked 
police stations in northern Rakhine State (nRS), one of the most impoverished states in 
Myanmar, looting and killing nine police officers and injuring another five.1 In turn, military 
and police targeted and attacked Rohingya armed groups, killing many innocent civilians.  
Myanmar‘s political turmoil does not only have ―political, religious, gender, ethnic, racial, 
class, structural and security factors‖, but has ―local, national and transnational causes and 
consequences‖ (Moore, 2017:38). It is especially the so-called ‗Rohingya problem‘ that 
brings into sharp focus ―the interwoven, and multi-layered, nature of violence in Myanmar‖ 
(Moore, 2017:38).2  In the wake of the events of 9 October 2016, there was a general outcry 
by the international community, taking to task the Government of Myanmar (GoM) for its 
impunity, brutality and ―calculated policy of terror‖ (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017a:42). While certain analysts have contended that this 
series of events has revealed ―a new dimension to the conflict between the Rohingya and 
the Buddhist majority‖ (Singh & Jani, 2016), others have interpreted these events:  
…against the long-standing pattern of violations and abuses; systematic and 
systemic discrimination; and policies of exclusion and marginalization against the 
Rohingya that have been in place for decades in nRS (OHCHR, 2017a:42). 
The politics of United Nations-mandated fact-finding goes to the heart of this research 
study. The ‗politicization‘ of domestic and international fact-finding - which encapsulates the 
idea of a failure to observe the principles of ‗universality‘, ‗non-selectivity‘ and ‗objectivity‘ 
(Farrell & Murphy, 2017:50) – is often couched as one of the central challenges to these 
bodies. On 24 March 2017, the European Union (EU), supported by the United States of 
America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK) and other countries, sponsored a resolution 
(A/HRC/34/L.8/Rev.1) which mandates an UN fact-finding mission to establish facts on 
violations, especially in Rakhine State (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2017).  Draft 
resolution A/HRC/34/L.8/Rev.1 gives effect to an ―independent fact-finding mission‖ to be 
selected by the President of the Human Rights Council to determine ―the facts and 
circumstances‖ of the ―alleged recent human rights violations by military and security forces, 
and abuses‖, in Myanmar, especially Rakhine state, including ―arbitrary detention, torture 
                                                          
1
 After the military junta‘s seizure of power in 1989, the new leaders formally changed the name of the 
country from ‗Burma‘ to ‗Myanmar‘: ―The choice of naming the country often carries a political 
connotation; some democracy activists continue to call the country Burma to protest the illegitimacy of 
the military junta‖ (Tan, 2012:1645). This research study will adopt the name Myanmar without 
prejudice to the correctness of either choice, unless directly quoting sources will use ‗Burma‘, or 
‗Burma‘ and ‗Myanmar‘ interchangeably. 
2
 With very few legal and political rights, the Rohingya community -not an officially recognised ethnic 
group in Myanmar – is  of Bengali decent, some having migrated to Myanmar multiple generations 
ago, while some having migrated illegally more recently (Walton & Hayward, 2014: endnote 7).  
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and inhuman treatment‖, ―rape and other forms of sexual violence‖, ―extrajudicial, summary 
or arbitrary killings, enforced disappearance, forced displacement and unlawful destruction 
of property‖, with the aim of ―full accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims‖ 
(UNHRC, 2017).   
There is a range of views regarding the purposes of this international UN-mandated 
fact-finding body. One school of thought contends that the fact-finding mission could assist 
Myanmar ―down the path of democracy‖ (Htun & Giannini, 2017). Another school of thought, 
however, proposes that the mission is a political tool: ―the UN appears to be intervening 
while it is in fact doing nothing‖ (Gholamzadeh, 2017). In the aftermath of the violence, two 
competing narratives had emerged that would set the stage for the eventual establishment of 
the UN-mandated fact-finding mission. On the one hand, one narrative, ―used by the central 
government and military and reflected by ethnic Rakhine interviewees, frames the crisis 
using national security rhetoric‖ (Aron & Gilmore, 2017:4). On the other hand, Human rights 
narratives refocused international attention on the central government‘s role in perpetuating 
the statelessness of the Muslim community. Given the scale of the exodus, the UN Secretary 
General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres spoke out, and his use of the term ‗ethnic cleansing‘ 
cleared the path for many others to apply this name to the problem (Mahoney, 2018:21). By 
contrast, according to a British Broadcasting Corporation report, the Former UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan said he would not describe the violence committed against Myanmar‘s 
Rohingya minority as ‗genocide.‘ Kofi Annan was appointed Chairperson of the Aung San 
Suu Kyi-established Rakhine Advisory Commission, mandated in 2016 to identify the factors 
that have resulted in violence, displacement and underdevelopment.  
Fact-finding is commonly defined as a ―method of ascertaining facts‖ through the 
evaluation and compilation of various information sources (Boutruche, 2011:106). The 
importance of international fact-finding missions has been established in international human 
rights law. In 1991, the General Assembly was convinced that the adoption of the 
Declaration on Fact-Finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security would contribute to strengthening the role of the United 
Nations (UN) and enhancing its effectiveness in maintaining international peace and security 
(United Nations General Assembly, 1991). Philip Alston highlights that the   
…duty arising under international human rights law to respect and protect life 
imposes an obligation upon governments to hold an independent inquiry into 
deaths where an extrajudicial execution may have taken place (Alston, 2011:81).  
One way to respond to the problems with national-level Commissions of Inquiry is ―to try to 
ensure that the necessary procedural safeguards are followed, and to increase external 
monitoring of the arrangements made. The other response, which is increasingly common, is 
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to insist that international fact-finding be undertaken, either in place of, or as a complement 
to, domestic initiatives‖ (Alston, 2011). Knuckey & Alston (2016:10) argue that while the 
―reality is that authentic domestic responses are ultimately the most likely to give rise to deep 
and enduring solutions,‖ the international dimensions of fact-finding can be of particular 
importance for two reasons: 
First, meaningful and effective domestic investigations are unlikely to be 
facilitated by the very governments that stand accused of serious human rights 
violations … This can leave some form of international involvement as an 
important route for breaking through the stalemate … Second, even when 
governments do take action at the domestic level, there are very often flaws or 
limitations built into the techniques adopted … official inquiries of this sort can be 
effectively captured, diverted, or muzzled by governments, and international 
scrutiny or prodding will often be needed (Knuckey & Alston, 2016:11).     
Apart from supplementing and acting as a complement to domestic fact-finding, especially 
when conducted as fact-finding, international human rights documentation is seen as paving 
the way for ―dealing with the past‖. Creating a record of past abuses is indeed ‗helpful with 
the prosecution of perpetrators, identification of victims for reparations programs, and the 
planning of memorials‘‖ (D‘Allessandra, 2017:59-60).  
The broad spectrum of views concerning the purposes of the international UN-
mandated fact-finding to Myanmar can be divided into two broad categories. A strong case 
can be made that these relatively extensively researched, and verified, across-case 
dynamics and processes arguably underlie the establishment of the UN-mandated fact-
finding mission to Myanmar. The inadequacy of domestic investigations seems to be among 
the primary reasons for why the international community ‗stepped in.‘ In a public statement 
by Amnesty International (AI) since the events of 9 October 2016, the international human 
rights group states that  
… none of the commissions established by the authorities are independent, 
impartial, effective or credible (Amnesty International, 2017:1).   
The deadlock within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is also an important 
explanation for why a different UN organ gave effect to the UN fact-finding mission, namely, 
the UN Human Rights Council. China remains one formidable barrier to the establishment of 
any UN Security Council-mandated Commissions of Inquiry (COI). China, a permanent 
member of the Security Council with veto power, has distanced itself from the resolution 
adopted by the Human Rights Council to dispatch a fact-finding mission to Myanmar to 
establish facts on violations, especially in Rakhine State (OHCHR, 2017c). From this 
perspective, the ‗corrective‗ function played by the Human Rights Council provides an 
important entry-point in terms of understanding the processes which underpin the 
establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar. The political problem of 
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accountability also goes some way to explaining the processes which underlie the 
establishment of the UN mission to Myanmar. Steven R. Ratner (2013) outlines how fact-
finding bodies, or those who create them, have responded to the ‗political problem‘ of 
accountability. Ratner (2013:70) highlights that  
the real aversion to and source of complaints about fact-finding bodies is 
fundamentally political – an aversion by states and some nonstate actors to 
accountability itself.  
A former UN resident coordinator in Myanmar, Charles Petrie, a acknowledged the likelihood 
of investigators gaining access were ―pretty slim‖ for precisely this reason (quoted in Perria, 
2017). There are various limitations, however, to structural explanations for the 
establishment of the UN-mandated  
Structural explanations do not adequately take into account the timing of this UN fact-
finding mission. The tatmadaw‟s 3 military operations have for many years been seen to 
involve systematic violations of human rights. Crimes such as arbitrary arrest, torture, or 
forced labour already featured centrally in the work on Myanmar by human rights 
organizations in the 1980s, and these and many other apparent human rights violations, to a 
certain extent, continue to preoccupy the United Nations. Even though inhibited from visiting 
Myanmar between November 2003 and November 2007, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, UN Special 
Rapporteur to Myanmar, described the ―the killing, terrorising or displacement of civilians‖ as 
part of a ―deliberate strategy‖ of the tatmadaw (Haacke, 2016:805).  Given the environment 
of armed conflict, the atrocities in his view constituted both crimes against humanity and war 
crimes (Haacke, 2016:805). Upon exiting his position, Pinheiro called on the UNSC to 
establish a Commission of Inquiry to hold to account those guilty of crimes perpetrated 
against ethnic minorities and ―to rupture the culture of impunity to deter future mass 
atrocities‖ (Haacke, 2016:805). Tomas Ojea Quintana, who succeeded Pinheiro in May 
2008, also claimed that certain human rights violations in Myanmar might entail categories of 
crimes of humanity or war crimes under the terms of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) and called for a commission of inquiry (Haacke, 2016:805).  However, 
neither a UNSC-mandated fact-finding mission was ever established, nor – until the 
establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar – a United Nations 
Human Rights Council (UNHCR) - mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar.  
Apart from not adequately explaining the timing of the establishment of the UN mission 
in 2017, structural explanations do not sufficiently take into account how the UN mission in 
question ‗reflects‘ the complexity of Myanmar‘s strategic context, characterised by the 
contestation, navigation and co-optation of the politics of legitimation. In a news report 
                                                          
3
 Tatmadaw (literally ‗royal force‘) is the vernacular name for Burma‘s armed forces (Selth, 2012:2).   
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released by Al Jazeera on 30 May 2017, Indira Jaising, former Chair of Myanmar Fact-
finding Mission, remarked in an interview with the news agency:  
Minorities all over the world are facing persecution. The situation of the Rohingya 
community in Myanmar is especially deplorable because they face the risk of a 
genocide (quoted in Waduge, 2017).  
She concluded saying that "We are hoping that our recommendations will make an impact 
and awaken the conscience of the international community" (Al Jazeera, 2017). On 27 July 
2017, the United Nations released a statement underlining the replacement of Indira Jaising 
by Marzuki Darusman as Chair of Myanmar Fact-finding Mission. The statement did not give 
reasons for the replacement. But ‗rumours‘ are that her statements made the UN mission 
vulnerable to ‗perceived bias.‘ Yet, the Commission has not only directly challenged the 
Annan Commission‘s diagnosis of the situation, it has also been dubbed by the newly-
appointed Chairperson as a ‗complement‘ to the so-called ‗Annan Commission,‘ indicating 
not only that who is to be recognised as an ‗audience‘ of UN legitimation is itself a contested 
question, but that the politics of personality is a key component of that politics.  What gets 
described as a ‗fact‘ in a human rights context has important consequences. The politics of 
fact-designation goes to the heart of this study, which, by contrast to a structural approach, 
conceptualises ‗human rights fact-finding‘ as part and parcel of discursive strategies (Megret, 
2016).  
Since Myanmar commenced its transition from a military government to a nominally 
civilian-led one in 2010,4 ‗national reconciliation‘ has become a pervasive concept amongst 
its politicians and champions for peace. The 2010 election was seen as a vital opening for 
dialogue and cooperation, as well as a potential tool for peace in a country ravaged by more 
than 60 years of civil war (Sawatzky, 2018). In Caretaking Democratization: The Military and 
Political Change in Myanmar, Renaud Egreteau accentuates that, to many outsider 
observers, Myanmar‘s political context seems to have been entirely reconfigured at the turn 
of the 2010s.   However, in contradistinction to ―a flurry of news reports and political 
analyses jubilantly depicting an unfolding ‗Burma Spring‘,‖ experienced scholars of the 
Burmese polity have been careful in their examination of ―an ongoing incremental process of 
                                                          
4 ―Myanmar‘s political opening is highly contested. Some see Myanmar‘s reforms as a ―survival 
strategy of the quasi-military government to overcome the danger of factionalism and to increase 
regime durability by creating power-sharing institutions … Others see the current opening as the 
beginning of a ―protracted transition‖ to unfold in the years to come … Some authors have also 
posited that it was the military‘s desire to establish domestic and international legitimacy that triggered 
Myanmar‘s elites to change … Robert Taylor contends that it was the country‘s dire economic 
situation that stimulated change‖ (Bünte & Dosch, 2015:3). Bünte and Dosch (2015:3), however, 
argue that ―the country‘s liberalisation is a deliberate strategy of the military, whose aim is to achieve 
economic renewal and a recalibration of foreign relations‖.   
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change – a process, as a matter of fact, which they seldom label as ‗democratic‘‖ (Egreteau, 
2016:9), arguing that the 
… further one moves from Yangon or Naypyitaw, the more difficult it becomes to 
reconcile the optimistic narratives about positive change and liberalization with 
the political realities of regions where militarization, insurgent warfare and 
trafficking of all sorts remain a way of life (Egreteau, 2016:7).5  
The so-called ‗Rohingya crisis,‘ which attracted unprecedented global attention in 
2012, was an exemplary case in point.  In 2013, the then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
stressed that the South-east Asian country must continue its democratic transition and 
overcome inter-communal violence that was threatening it (United Nations, 2013). The 2014 
US human rights report described the humanitarian and human rights crisis in Rakhine State 
as ―the most troubling exception and threat to the country‘s progress‖ (quoted in Haacke, 
2015:66). In 2015, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) Zeid Ra‘ad Al 
Hussein warned that guaranteeing ―accountability for the military will be a key test for the 
transition‖.  Obama had categorically linked one to the other, arguing that democratization 
itself is contingent on resolution of the Rohingya issue (Choudhury, 2017).  With the onset of 
‗intercommunal‘ violence in Rakhine State in 2012, scholarly, human rights and political 
orthodoxies were fundamentally reshaped by the logic of ‗Rohingya‘ victimhood, the 
‗climactic‘ moment being the events of 9 October 2016, underpinned by various continuities 
and discontinuities in Myanmar‘s strategic context. It is this strategic context that the 
research study will endeavour to unpick with a view to discovering the politics behind the 
establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar.   
The politics of legitimation is key to UN-mandated fact-finding. A common presumption 
is that transitional justice, defined as ―the conception of justice associated with periods of 
political change‖ (Teitel, 2003:69), will be recognized as ―a legitimate and (value-) neutral 
tool‖, since it is rooted in ―international norms and standards‖ (Rubli, 2012:9). Undergirding 
this belief is the ―universality of those norms and standards, such as human rights‖ (Rubli, 
2012:9). ―Due to their externality‖, they appear to be indifferent to ―local power struggles and 
political instrumentalization‖ (Rubli, 2012:9). Rubli (2012:9) argues that, in so doing, 
transitional justice champions refute ―the inherent political nature of the process‖.  In Do 
Facts Exist, Can they Be „Found‟, and Does it Matter?, Frederic Megret (2016:46) offers a 
‗dynamic view‘ of ‗international human rights fact-finding‘:  
…we are left with nothing but the struggle over facts, a struggle that should be 
appreciated at its just value as certainly not doomed but evidently fraught with 
ambiguities.  
                                                          
5
 Yangon (formerly known as Rangoon) is the largest city in Myanmar. While Naypyitaw is the modern 
capital of Myanmar, north of former capital, Yangon.   
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What the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar reveals about fact-finding is the 
discursive nature and dynamism of international UN-mandated fact-finding and, echoing 
previous studies, that agency – or personalities – is a key dimension of these politics.6  
Apart from Megret (2016), however, several key authors inform the theoretical 
framework of this research study. In Cronin‘s (2002) article entitled The Two Faces of the 
United Nations: The Tension Between Intergovernmentalism and Transnationalism is a vital 
point of entry in this regard. Providing a theoretical backdrop, Bruce Cronin advances the 
argument that, in the context of the United Nations, intergovermentalism and 
transnationalism are ―two forces that encompass different sets of interests and reflect distinct 
constituencies‖ (Cronin, 2002:53). Bexell & Jonsson‘s article entitled Audiences of (De) 
legitimation in Global Governance also throws a bright light on the legitimation processes in 
the United Nations. In Legitimacy in Global Governance: sources, processes, and 
consequences, Bexell & Jonsson (2018:119) develop two key analytical distinctions to 
advance the empirical study of audiences: namely, between ‗constituencies‘ and ‗observers‘ 
of Global Governance Institutions (GGIs); and between ‗targeted‘ and ‗self-appointed‘ 
audiences.  
With a view to shedding light on the overarching aim of this research study, the 
following research objectives – using ‗process tracing‘ as a qualitative technique – are 
explored:  
 evaluate how Myanmar‘s strategic context has evolved over time;  
 examine the history of domestic and international fact-finding in the context of 
Myanmar;  
 determine how the ‗accountability debate‘ has evolved over time; and  
 tease out how the interface between Myanmar‘s strategic context, the history of 
domestic and international fact-finding, and framings of the ‗accountability debate‘ 
can be characterised.  
In the final analysis, this research study demonstrates how Myanmar‘s strategic context has 
not only played a ‗constitutive role‘ in the establishment of the UN mission, but how the UN 
mission, as part and parcel of these discursive processes, both challenges and reinstates 
                                                          
6
 In The Goldstone Report without Goldstone, Richard Falk (2011:98-99) examines the Report of the 
United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict and the identification the UNHRC fact-
finding mission on the Gaza war so exclusively with its chair: ―There was always something rather 
disturbing about identifying the UNHRC fact-finding mission on the Gaza war so exclusively with its 
chair … One reason for this identification was probably that the typically opaque and cumbersome 
official UN name, Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, was 
unusable in public discourse. More importantly, however, the degree of attention paid to the person of 
Goldstone reflected the media‘s unwillingness to resist the temptation of utilizing his known identity as 
a prominent Jew and an eminent international jurist to draw attention to a high-profile inquiry into 
controversial Israeli practices. Critics of Israel also seized upon Goldstone‘s long history as a Zionist 
and friend of Israel to lend additional credibility to the findings of the report, which, as seemed 
inevitable, would be highly critical‖. 
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various political compromises and agendas. This research study is comprised of four 
Chapters. 
In Chapter 1, I provide an historical overview of United Nations-mandated Fact-
finding brings into sharp focus not only several crucial political junctures in UN-mandated 
fact-finding, but equally scholarly understandings of UN-mandated fact-finding. In Chapter 2, 
by way of a literature review, I provide the conceptual backdrop to the theoretical framework 
employed in this research study which combines two bodies of scholarly literature, namely, 
concerning ‗Legitimacy in Global Governance Institutions‘ and United Nations-mandated 
‗human rights fact-finding‘, analysing  the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar as 
a form of ‗discursive practise‘ (Megret, 2016:28), established (primarily) with a view to the 
cultivation and maintenance of legitimacy. The value of this research is threefold. Firstly, it 
reveals the dynamic interplay between domestic and international fact-finding and the 
political – and strategic – contexts in which they are established. Secondly, this research 
study has interrogated how the politics of legitimation underlies the establishment of UN-
mandated fact-finding missions.  Thirdly, and critically, focuses on the politics of the ‗here 
and now‘ and the contingencies of within-case dynamics which underlie the establishment of 
the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar.     
In Chapter 3, the analysis bears out that several influential events/periods – 
characterised by the emergence and contestation of two audiences of legitimation – have 
influenced the eventual establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar. 
In 3.2, I trace the emergence and the politics surrounding the debate on a UN Commission 
of Inquiry in 2010 and Myanmar‘s 2011 ‗democratic opening‘ and account for the 
‗backgrounding‘ of the ‗accountability debate‘ in international policy and scholarly circles. In 
3.3, I hone in on the onset of the 2012 ‗intercommunal‘ violence in Myanmar and the political 
compromises underlying the establishment of the so-called ‗Kofi Annan Commission, 
explaining how the ‗backgrounding‘ of accountability increasingly turned into a policy of 
‗deflection‘. In 3.4 and 3.5, I interrogate the 2016 state-sponsored violence in northern 
Rakhine state, the processes underlying the establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding 
mission to Myanmar and the ‗foregrounding‘ of the accountability debate. To this end, I 
unpack the Myanmar‘s strategic context and the legitimising role of the UN mandated fact-
finding mission to Myanmar.   
In Chapter 4, I discuss my research findings. Apart from its theoretical value, this 
research raises critical questions about Myanmar‘s strategic context, the UN-mandated fact-
finding mission to Myanmar, and the contested question of the ‗audiences of legitimation‘, 
employed in this research study. By way of example, there are other distinct strategic 
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dynamics which arguably confound, but also influence, the political dynamics of Myanmar‘s 
strategic context which are the empirical focus of this research study. Furthermore, apart 
from those alleged in this research study, there are various other rationales for why the 
genocide-claim was possibly used by the former Chairperson of the UN mandated fact-
finding mission to Myanmar. Finally, subsequent UN framings of the UN mission as 
complementary to the so-called ‗Annan Commission‘ need not necessarily be read in the 























The United Nations-mandated Fact-finding mission to Myanmar in 
Context 
1.1 General Comments 
An historical overview of United Nations-mandated Fact-finding brings into sharp focus 
not only several crucial political junctures in the history of UN-mandated fact-finding, but 
advances in scholarly understandings of international fact-finding. The 1992 Yugoslavia 
Commission brought to light the serious consequences of operating within a fundamentally 
political institution and how the states responsible for creating or supporting the 
establishment of a commission of inquiry determine, to a great extent, the perception of the 
legitimacy of that commission. The proliferation of mechanisms similar to the 1992 
Yugoslavia Commission has been astonishing and, based on scholarly accounts flowing 
from these fact-finding enterprises, forces us to consider the role of an array of audiences in 
the establishment of international fact-finding, and that the credibility of a fact-finding process 
requires the support of a multitude of key actors: transnational advocacy networks, social 
movements, states that are at the receiving-end of international fact-finding missions, and 
global media. This historical overview, thus, provides conceptual insight for the theory of UN-
mandated fact-finding employed in this research study.      
1.2 Contextualising Human Rights Documentation 
The plasticity of „facts‟ themselves, and the negotiation of what is and is not 
accepted as being „factual, is not subsidiary to conflict but central to it 
(Eltringham, 2003:104). 
In The Transformation of Human Rights Fact-finding, Sarah Knuckey and Philip Alston  
(2016:5,11,15) identify at least three emerging trends in the changing context of international 
human rights fact-finding: 1.) a surge in a diverse array of human rights fact-finding missions 
established by intergovernmental organizations; 2.) advancing investigative methods; and 3.) 
a rich scholarly literature that challenges the foundations of human rights law and critiques 
the contemporary practise of human rights. UN fact-finding mechanisms can in fact be part 
of UN peacekeeping missions when these have human rights components, or can be 
appointed by the Security Council, the Human Rights Council, and designated by the High 
Commissioner, or even by the Secretary-General (See D‘Alessandra, 2017: supra note 54). 
Given the diverse array of human rights fact-finding missions established by 
intergovernmental organizations, it is perhaps unsurprising that many across- and within-
case scholarly (especially qualitative) research studies address, either directly or indirectly, 
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the following cross-cutting and interrelated questions: What is ‗human rights fact-finding‘? 
What are the ‗processes‘ that underlie the establishment of international human rights fact-
finding missions? What constitutes ‗credible fact-finding‘?  
There is a tendency for UN fact-finding, however, to be construed as an exercise 
which is ―entirely norm-driven or at least norm-determined‖: ―It is the norms that tell us what 
facts one is looking for‖ (Megret, 2016:36).  According to the 1991 UN Declaration on Fact-
Finding, reports of commissions of inquiry should be limited to a presentation of findings of a 
factual nature and that, in determining which facts are relevant facts, the Commissions 
should be guided by their mandate (United Nations General Assembly, 1991). Numerous 
contemporary commissions are instructed in their mandate to adopt international law 
standards as a ―frame of reference‖ to decide which facts are ―relevant facts‖ (van den Herik, 
2014:25). Although often termed ‗fact-finding missions‘, commissions of inquiry are either 
mandated to do more than this or eventually go further than this in their work,  
for example in making determinations on the legal framework that is applicable to 
the factual situations they are called upon to investigate and on the scope of the 
relevant legal rules and norms at issue, as well as engaging in analysis as to 
whether particular acts amount to violations of the particular branch or rule of 
international law under focus‖ (Henderson, 2017).  
In various respects, the 1992 Yugoslavia Commission, established by the Security 
Council pursuant to Resolution 780 in 1992 to investigate war crimes in the Former 
Yugoslavia, was unprecedented.7 Cherif Bassiouni (2001), who served as the Chairman of 
the 1992 Yugoslavia Commission following its first chairman‘s resignation, wrote eloquently 
about some of the challenges the mechanism encountered. Bassiouni‘s (2001) writing 
brought to light the serious consequences of operating within a fundamentally political 
institution. According to Bassiouni (2001:31), the establishment, methods and goals of fact-
finding depend on the organ or body that establishes it, the mandate given to it, and the 
extent of political support from the permanent Security Council members, particularly the 
Western ones, ―which determines its real authority and effectiveness‖. Indeed, the organ 
and, therefore, the states responsible for creating or supporting the establishment of a 
commission of inquiry determine, to a great extent, the perception of the legitimacy of that 
commission. Powerful states, however, are but one player on this theoretical ‗stage.‘  
As alluded to above, the proliferation of mechanisms similar to the 1992 Yugoslavia 
Commission has been astonishing. For example, since 1993, the United Nations Office of 
                                                          
7 D‘Alessandra (2017:63) points out that this is the first time that ―a domestic or international fact-
finding mechanism was mandated to inquire beyond traditional human rights law, with law amongst its 
competencies‖ It was also for unprecedented in that ―a United Nations established international 
commission of inquiry contributed directly to the establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal, 
and fed its report and findings to the Office of the Prosecutor‖ (D‘Alessandra, 2017:63).  
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the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was established, and tasked to support 
and deploy circa 50 commissions and fact-finding missions (D‘Alessandra, 2017:63). 
Knuckey and Alston (2016:5) highlight that, while some fact-finding activity has become 
relatively routinized and novel fact-finding procedures are also now being activated under 
the auspices of various UN human rights treaty bodies, a broad swathe of fact-finding is 
relatively ad hoc, taking:   
… the form of diverse types of inquiries established by a range of 
interngovernmental bodies, both international and regional, and is often set up 
on a one-off basis in response to a particularly serious or politicized incident or 
pattern of abuses. These fact-finding bodies are differently composed, are given 
varying mandates, use widely differing methodologies, and tend to serve a broad 
range of objectives.   
In this context, there is a striking contrast between the readiness of the Security Council to 
establish commissions of inquiry (CoI) for Lebanon and Sudan and the  of United Nations 
Security Council investigations of Syria in its civil war, ―of the two sides in the two Gaza 
wars, or even of something like civilian casualties caused by drone attacks in Pakistan‖ 
(Ratner, 2015:109). Stephen J Rapp highlights that, at the same time that the United Nations 
Security Council in New York was blocked, the United Nations Human Rights Council in 
Geneva was able to establish commissions of inquiry or other fact-finding missions for Syria, 
Iraq, and South Sudan, and also in other situations where vetoes likely would have been 
cast, for example, North Korea, Eritrea, Sri Lanka, and Gaza (Rapp, 2016).8 An illustrative 
example is the 2009 Goldstone Commission on Alleged Violations of Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law during the Gaza Conflict.  
The investigation was commissioned by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 
into war crimes allegations arising from the Gaza war (2008–09). The report was 
tremendously critical of the Israeli system of military justice and expressed serious doubts 
about Israel‘s willingness to investigate and prosecute crimes (Frulli, 2012:1335). But as 
Richard Falk (2012:102) soberly highlights, the  
… realities of UN politics are presently such that although Israel and its 
supporters often cannot prevent the UN from launching investigations of serious 
allegations of international law violations (such as arose in connection with OCL 
or the 2010 flotilla incident), up to now they have been able to stymie any 
implementation involving the establishment and activation of accountability 
mechanisms.   
                                                          
8 Van den Herik (2014:24) also contemplates the contextual possibilities at play in the proliferation of 
Human Rights Council-established commissions of inquiry vis-à-vis the Security Council: ―It may in 
fact also be that, occasionally, these Geneva-based commissions rather function as a correction 
mechanism to New York dynamics and in particular to a paralysed Security Council. In such a case, 
they would represent public opinion and have the de facto aim to express condemnation, to present a 
compelling conflict narrative so as to counter the Security Council inaction or to elicit alternative 
involvement by the International Criminal Court‖.  
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Unsurprisingly, the report triggered immense controversy, generated an array of follow-up 
analyses, and brought to public awareness ―the previously invisible issues relating to fact-
finding methodologies and outcomes‖ (Knuckey & Alston, 2016:6).9 While the inadequacy of 
domestic fact-finding, the dynamics within the Security Council, and the ‗corrective‘ function 
of other UN organs like the UN Human Rights Council, are among the key processes 
underlying the establishment of international fact-finding missions, another key political fault 
line that shapes the establishment of UN fact-finding bodies is the political problem of 
accountability. An instructive case in point is the Secretary-General‘s Panel of Experts on 
Accountability in Sri Lanka.       
The Secretary-General‘s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka was again 
potentially ‗precedent-setting.‘ In The Political Dimension of International Human Rights 
Fact-Finding, Steven R. Ratner (2013) sketches how fact-finding bodies –and those who 
establish them – have addressed  to the ‗political problem‘ of accountability. Ratner 
(2013:70) points out that  
… the real aversion to and source of complaints about fact-finding bodies is 
fundamentally political – an aversion by states and some nonstate actors to 
accountability itself.  
After the end of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009, when the United Nations Secretary-General 
was considering creating a commission of inquiry to look into the last phase of that war,even 
though Ban Ki-moon could legally create a fact-finding body,10 the issue was far more tricky 
politically (Ratner, 2013:71). Ratner explains, nevertheless, how the Secretary-General‘s 
Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, an alternative to a fully-fledged Commission 
of Inquiry, was not enough to ―ensure acceptance and silence the critics of fact-finding‖:  
The government of Sri Lanka attacked the Panel of Experts when it was created, 
denied us access to the country, met with us only once in New York during our 
mandate, and vilified the report after it was issued (Ratner, 2013:71).     
Ratner (2013:72) summarises that the key moral to be learned from the case study in 
question is that the legitimacy of a fact-finding process is not just about the science 
underpinning it, but the backing of important actors, a context-specific mandate, an alertness 
to the range of audiences who will read to a report, and a recognition of the long-term 
                                                          
9 Initially, Justice Richard Goldstone, when approached to lead the mission, concluded that the 
mandate ‗was stacked against Israel, and would have been a one-sided investigation‘ (quoted in 
Grace, 2015:49). The Israeli Government raised ―the issue of the renegotiated mandate, among other 
factors, to justify Israel‘s decision not to cooperate with the mission‖ (Grace, 2014:50). 
10 It is accepted that Article 99 of the UN Charter does not only confer upon the Secretary General a 
right to bring matters to the attention of the Security Council, but that this right carries with it a broad 
discretion to conduct inquiries unilaterally and to engage in informal diplomatic activity in regard to 




objectives of the process – justice and truth for the victims of human rights abuses, national 
reconciliation, and an improved focus on structural violence to prevent the relapse into 
atrocities. Frederic Megret (2016:29) contrasts the conventional view with a more dynamic 
one of fact-finding as a form of ―strategic practice‖ geared towards the production of truth 
claims, ―but more generally the creation of social consensus‖. However, a key implication of 
this insight, and a core argument of this research study, is that as ―the spectrum of 
audiences‖ broadens in global governance, ―discord is likely to grow‖ (Bexell, 2014:297). 
Moreover, audiences of legitimation are not simply ‗out there‘ but are constructed through 
the interface between ―legitimation efforts of governing bodies and the reactions of targeted 




















CHAPTER 2  
Theoretical Framework 
2.1 General remarks 
There are three distinct conceptualizations of United Nations-mandated fact-finding 
which correspond with three distinct understandings of ‗facts.‘  A key feature of the first 
conception of international human rights ‗fact-finding‘ is that it conflates what is ‗factual‘ and 
‗the law‘ (United Nations General Assembly, 1991). The second conception of UN-mandated 
fact-finding presupposes a ‗fact-law distinction‘ (Krebs, 2017). While the above two 
conceptions can be conceptualised as ‗conventional‘ conceptualizations of international fact-
fact-fining, the third conception, which is employed in the context of this research study, is a 
dynamic perspective, which conceptualises ‗international human rights fact-finding‘ as 
inherently part and parcel of ‗discursive strategies‘ (Van Den Herik, 2014; Megret, 2016), 
particularly, ‗legitimation‘ processes (Bexell & Jonsson, 2018). In the final analysis, the 
theoretical framework employed in this research study is informed by the works of several 
scholars and two branches of scholarly literature.    
2.2 Conventional versus ‘dynamic’ conceptions of fact-finding  
As highlighted in the Introduction, fact-finding is commonly defined as a ―method of 
ascertaining facts‘‖ through the evaluation and compilation of various information sources 
(Boutruche, 2011:106). Black‘s Law Dictionary defines ‗fact‘ as an ―actual and absolute 
reality, as distinguished from mere supposition or opinion‖ (quoted in Megret, 2016:30). Fact-
finding serves to illuminate ―the circumstances, causes, consequences and aftermath‖ of an 
event or episode from a ―systematic collection of facts‖, which ―can be done to dispel or 
verify allegations‖ (Boutruche, 2011:106). A number of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have highlighted the importance of the UN mission in this regard. Theoretically, the 
process is chiefly geared towards ―clarifying the disputed facts through impartial 
investigation‖ which may then enable ―the parties‘ objective of resolving the dispute. Among 
the parties it is often a difference of opinion about the facts that gives rise to the dispute in 
the first place‖ (Neale, 2011:85). It is, therefore, vital: 
… to avoid giving biased mandates to inquiry bodies. Investigating situations of 
armed conflict should involve scrutiny of the behaviour of all parties involved. 
The requirements of balance and objectivity impose this condition, as does the 
nature of the investigated events and an essence of the violations of the laws of 
armed conflict or otherwise international humanitarian law (Neale, 2011:86).  
A key feature of this conception of international human rights ‗fact-finding‘ is that it 
conflates what is ‗factual‘ and ‗the law‘. As highlighted in the foregoing section, according to 
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the 1991 UN Declaration on Fact-Finding, reports of commissions of inquiry should be 
limited to a presentation of findings of a factual nature and that, in determining which facts 
are relevant facts, the Commissions should be guided by their mandate (United Nations 
General Assembly, 1991). Numerous contemporary commissions are instructed in their 
mandate to adopt international law standards as a ―frame of reference‖ to decide which facts 
are ―relevant facts‖ (van den Herik, 2014:25). A criticism of this conception is that it is ‗blind‘ 
to the diversity of products that fall under the label of ‗facts,‘ and to some of the fragile 
premises that seem to underscore the notion (Megret, 2016:29). The draft resolution which 
gives effect to the fact-finding mission to Myanmar mentions categories of crimes for 
investigation, for example, torture, where an absolute prohibition exists under international 
human rights law, with torture also characterised as a grave breach of International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL), and as a crime under International Criminal Law (ICL).11  
A partial critique of this notion of ‗fact-finding‘ and an alternative conception of ‗fact-
finding‘ presupposes a ‗fact-law distinction.‘  In The Legalization of Truth in International 
Fact-Finding, Shiri Krebs defines the ―legalization of truth‖ phenomenon as ―the adoption of 
legal discourse to construct and interpret facts‖. While the 1991 General Assembly resolution 
defined fact-finding in terms of obtaining ―detailed knowledge of the relevant facts,‖ most 
U.N. fact-finding missions were not created to fulfill the goal of ascertaining facts alone:  
Instead, these fact-finding missions were specifically tasked with other goals, 
such as determining state and individual responsibility for violations of 
international law, making recommendations regarding reform and reparations, 
and promoting accountability (Krebs, 2017:95-96).  
These commissions have a ―strong accountability focus‖ and, on occasion, even engage in 
―naming and shaming exercises‖ (van den Herik, 2014:4). The commissions are thus overall 
authoritative in nature and they employ the language of law, and progressively more even 
international criminal law, ―to assert their authority‖ (2014:4).    
In The Accountability Turn in Third Wave Human Rights Fact-Finding, Federica 
D‘Allessandra  explains that a ―first stretch‖ of these mandates happened around the early to 
mid-1990s when, ―besides international human rights law as understood within the UN 
system‖, fact-finding bodies and commissions of ―the third wave‖ started monitoring and 
assessing compliance with international humanitarian law, ―when these operated in relation 
to international or non-international armed conflicts‖ (D‘Alessandra, 2017:65). Likewise, 
since the mid-2000s, a ―second stretch‖ to the relevant body of law appears to have 
occurred, ―reaching beyond international human rights law and international humanitarian 
                                                          
11 D‘Allessandra (2017) crucially highlights that, in international criminal law, ―torture can be 
constituted as a crime against humanity, a war crime, and as an act of genocide.‖  
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law,‖ to encompass international criminal law as a constituent element of the legal 
framework applicable to these monitoring bodies (D‘Alessandra, 2017:65). D‘Alessandra 
(2017:65) explains that  
human rights inquiries have largely explained that their understanding of 
accountability goes beyond that of criminal prosecutions, … scholars have 
highlighted a limited application of international criminal law as emphasised 
within their mandates, which ‗can be inferred from the explicit reference in the 
mandate to, for example, ‗crimes‘ and ‗identifying those responsible‘  
This preponderance of language is evident when surveying the mandates of UN 
commissions of inquiry and other investigative mechanisms set up since the mid-2000s.  
Apart from mandating the UN fact-finding mission to Myanmar ―to establish the facts and 
circumstances of the alleged recent human rights violations by military and security forces, 
and abuses, in Myanmar, in particular Rakhine state,‖ the draft resolution also stipulates, 
after listing various categories of violations that implicate distinct bodies of international 
public law, that these investigations should be carried out ―with a view to full accountability 
for perpetrators and justice for victims‖ (Human Rights Council, 2017). Krebs (2017:97) 
explains that the ‗legalization of truth‘ ‗echoes‘ the ‗naming and shaming‘ strategy adopted 
by many non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While this conception of ‗fact-finding‘ also 
relies on a strong notion of facts as existing, it nonetheless suggests a note of scepticism 
about the diversity of products that fall under the label of ‗facts,‘ and some of the fragile 
premises that seem to underscore the notion. Crucially, it upholds the a ‗fact-law‘ distinction:  
It is clear from this data that the past decade has brought a meaningful rise not 
only in the number of fact-finding missions, but also in the adoption of legal 
discourse and concrete legal goals such as accountability (Krebs, 2017:96-97).  
This framework can, nevertheless, can be further contextualised.  According to Larissa van 
den Herik (2014:34), the overarching distinction between ―traditional and contemporary 
commissions of inquiry‖ does not correspond to ―the fact/law distinction in the sense that 
traditional commissions were pure fact-finders and contemporary commissions are law-
appliers‖ (2014:34). ―The fact/law distinction is simply not that easy to make‖ as fact-based 
―findings may…have as many or even more legal implications as legal characterizations‖ 
(2014:34). The overarching distinction between traditional and contemporary commissions is 
not their recourse to international law, ―but rather the underlying purposes of their mission‖ 
(2014:34).   
In Do Facts Exist, Can they Be „Found‟, and Does it Matter?, Frederic Megret 
(2016:28) offers a ‗dynamic view‘ of ‗international human rights fact-finding.‘ She argues that: 
‗Facts‘ are part and parcel of discursive strategies. This does not tell us anything 
about whether facts exist in some essential way, but it does tell us something 
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about the existence of a background politics of fact designation, and an 
inevitable tendency to compete for ‗facts‘.    
In some contexts, the capacity to portray one‘s activities as driven by ‗facts alone‘ may 
significantly bolster one‘s legitimacy, since to ―claim that something is a fact is to claim a 
certain authority, which one may of course want to claim for a variety of ends‖ (Megret, 
2016:28). In From Design to Implementation: The Interpretation of Fact-finding Mandates, 
Rob Grace (2015:28-29) highlights that because the context from which fact-finding 
mandates arise is political in character, the text of fact-finding mandates reflects political 
compromises struck between ―different entities within a mandating body,‖ ―the political 
biases of members of the mandating entity‖ and ―the general lack of technical expertise held 
by the mandators‖.   
This research study examines the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar as a 
form of ‗discursive practise‘ (Megret, 2016:28), established (primarily) with a view to the 
cultivation and maintenance of legitimacy. As such, it combines two bodies of scholarly 
literature. Apart from the scholarly literature on UN-mandated fact-finding, which recognises 
the ‗accountability turn‘ in international human rights fact-finding, this mini-dissertation draws 
on the scholarly literature on Legitimacy in Global Governance Institutions. In so doing, it 
assesses the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar as a mechanism through which 
…various individuals, groups, governments, and institutions vie to map out a 
narrative of the past that legitimates their agendas or desire for justice, to assert 
or reject the right to legal redress for and the moral outrage about ‗the crime of 
all crimes‘, and to acknowledge or disavow memories, experiences, suffering, 
and losses linked to mass murder (O‘Neill, 2010:195).   
Legitimation is the process by which actors seek to build legitimacy for a rule or ruler (Hurd, 
2007). ―Where legitimacy as a belief is a subjective and an individualistic quality‖, 
legitimation is a process that is intrinsically ―social and political‖ (Hurd, 2007). Actors and 
institutions continuously work to legitimize their power, ―and challengers work to delegitimate 
it‖ (Hurd, 2007). ―Material incentives and normative appeals‖ are distinct strategies for 
legitimation and their realization hinges on how the audience responds to them (Hurd, 2007). 
In contrast to studies which focus on legitimation strategies, this research study hones in on 
the ‗audiences of legitimation.‘  
The value of this research is threefold. Firstly, it reveals the dynamic interplay 
between domestic and international fact-finding and the political – and strategic – contexts in 
which they are established. Secondly, this research study has interrogated how the politics 
of legitimation underlies the establishment of UN-mandated fact-finding missions.  Thirdly, 
and critically, it focuses on the politics of the ‗here and now‘ and the contingencies of within-
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case dynamics which underlie the establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to 
Myanmar. At the heart of a fact-finding mission is a struggle over what is a ―fact‖, which is 
not about what happened but about what narrative about events is accepted as legitimate, 
and by whom. To this end, this research project employs two key constructs: ‗fact-finding as 
a ‗strategic exercise‘ and ‗audiences of legitimation.‘   
2.3. Theoretical Framework  
2.3.1 Fact-finding as a ‘strategic exercise’ 
In positing a relationship between power and legitimacy, or between practical 
capacity and social sanction, one crucial question remains — in which social 
constituency must an actor command legitimacy for his or her power to be 
augmented? (Reus-Smit, 2007:164)   
This question posed by Christian Reus-Smit– and the fundamentally contested nature 
thereof – lies at the heart of the newly mandated UN fact-finding mission with Myanmar. With 
a view to operationalizing Frederic Megret‘s (2016) ‗dynamic‘ view or conceptualization of 
international human rights fact-finding, this research study argues that the establishment of 
the UN fact-finding mission to Myanmar is to be understood primarily in the context of the 
contested nature of the identity of ‗audiences of legitimation‘. Furthermore, this research 
study employs a process-tracing research methodology, looking to critical historical junctures 
where explanations challenge conventional wisdom and hypotheses of the literature,  in this 
case, that the UN-mandated fact-finding mission is intended to (only) discover the ‗truth 
about the past.‘     
In Do Facts Exist, Can they Be „Found‟, and Does it Matter?, Frederic Megret offers a 
‗dynamic view‘ of ‗international human rights fact-finding‘: ―Human rights fact-finders…work 
is embedded is a highly peculiar, historically situated attempt at establishing facts that are 
relevant to the understanding of what constitutes human rights violations‖ (Megret, 2016:36). 
―Ultimately,‖ according to Frederic Megret, ―facts are constructed by our sense of what are 
socially relevant and salient facts‖ (Megret, 2016:36).  Megret (2016:46) describes ‗fact-
finding‘ as  
…a practice, one that is broader ultimately than its name suggests and includes 
the ability to legitimise, communicate, and strategize about facts. In the end, 
though, we are left with nothing but the struggle over facts, a struggle that should 
be appreciated at its just value as certainly not doomed but evidently fraught with 
ambiguities.  
It stands to question, however, how will this conception of human rights fact-finding be 
‗operationalized‘ in the context of this research study with the UN-mandated Fact-finding 
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Mission to Myanmar as the empirical focus? To this end, I employ Bexell & Jonsson‘s (2018) 
notion of ‗audiences of legitimation.  
2.3.2  ‘Audiences’ of (de)legitimation 
In The Two Faces of the United Nations: The Tension Between 
Intergovernmentalism and Transnationalism, Bruce Cronin (2002) explains that the UN 
system consists of at least four distinct categories of actors serving at least three different 
constituencies: ―the intergovernmental decisionmaking bodies (Security Council and General 
Assembly), the affiliated organizations and specialised agencies, the Secretariat, and the 
associated NGOs‖. ―Its constituencies‖, Cronin (2002:64) continues, ―are the member states, 
local populations who are the recipients of programs and services, and the broadly defined 
international community‖. He continues that, within the UN, ―transnationalism and 
intergovernmentalism reflect distinct constituencies and therefore produce different 
behavioural incentives to the actors involved‖ (Cronin, 2002:64). As an International 
Organization, the United Nations is, according to Alan James,  
…fundamentally nothing more than an association of sovereign states … each 
member will be trying to use the United Nations to further its own interests … 
States have not joined out of respect for the ‗UN idea‘ (but) but for what they can 
get out of it (quoted in Cronin, 2002: 55).  
As a Transnational Organization, the ‗UN system‘ is also a complex network of specialised 
agencies, NGOs, and affiliated semiautonomous organizations that serve a variety of 
constituencies in a wide variety of areas (Cronin, 2002:58).  However, according to Bexell & 
Jonsson (2018:120), thus far, ―systematic knowledge is lacking on how, when, and why 
agents of (de)legitimation target certain audiences and the conditions under which 
audiences are instead self-appointed reactors to legitimation attempts‖.  
Existing investigations of legitimation and delegitimation examine primarily the 
practices employed by agents in attempts to boost or undermine the legitimacy beliefs of 
others. Far less is known about the nature, the construction, and the reactions of the 
audiences of (de)legitimation efforts. Bexell & Jonsson (2018:119) develop two key 
analytical distinctions to advance the empirical study of audiences: namely, between 
‗constituencies‘ and ‗observers‘ of GGIs; and between ‗targeted‘ and ‗self-appointed‘ 
audiences. While ‗constituencies‘ are ―audiences with institutionalised political bonds to a 
governing authority,‖ ―observers lack such a connection‖ (Bexell & Jonsson, 2018:120). 
Another key distinction is, thus, between targeted audiences – those constructed by agents 
of (de)legitimation strategies – and self-appointed audiences – those constructed by 
respondents themselves (Bexell & Jonsson, 2018:120). It is a matter of empirical inquiry to 
ascertain which audiences are applicable in a given (de)legitimation process, ―and to explain 
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how these audiences vary between different (de)legitimation settings‖ (Bexell & Jonsson, 
2018:122).  
Against the backdrop of Myanmar‘s evolving strategic context, the central contention 
of this research study is that the key political problem at issue in the establishment of the UN 
mission is that the identity of the ‗audiences of legitimation‘ is itself a contested question, 
reflecting a broader tension between intergovernmentalism and transnationalism, ―two forces 
that encompass different sets of interests and reflect distinct constituencies‖ (Cronin, 
2002:53). The various processes at play can, thus, be summed up in terms of 1.) the tension 
between ‗intergovernmentalism‘ and ‗transnationalism‘; 2.) the emergence of two ‗audiences 
of legitimation‘; and 3.) the contestation of the identity of the ‗audience of legitimation‘.  
2.4 Methodology 
The underlying methodology is informed by Stefano Guzzini‘s (2012:4) interpretivist, 
historical and multi-layered approach to process tracing whereby links between possible 
causes and observed outcomes are mapped out in a way that take the actors‘ 
understandings of international events and phenomena in question as the starting point of 
analysis, rather than the events and phenomena themselves. Four influential events/periods 
– characterised by the emergence and contestation of two regimes of legitimation – 
influenced the eventual establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar.  
Drawing on both primary and secondary resources, documentation will be used as a data 
gathering technique.  
Drawing on two sets of scholarship concerning ‗Legitimacy in Global Governance 
Institutions‘ and United Nations-mandated ‗human rights fact-finding,‘ respectively, in the 
following section I provide an in-depth empirical and theoretical analysis of the motives of the 
United Nations in Myanmar, the key actor being studied in this research study, and the 
context of the establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar. In 
Chapter 3.2, I trace the emergence of the politics of personality (Steinberg, 2010, Selth, 
2017), by interrogating the debate on the UN Commission of Inquiry (Tan, 2012), the 2011 
‗Burmese Spring‘ (Egreteau, 2016), and the ‗backgrounding‘ of the accountability question in 
international policy and scholarly discourses (Mathieson, 2018; Popham, 2016). In so doing, 
I evaluate the motives of the United Nations in the context of the Two Faces of the United 
Nations (Cronin, 2002) and, with Bexell & Jonsson‘s (2018) notion of the ‗audiences of 
legitimation‘, the United Nations legitimation processes in the context of its liberal ‗peace-
building‘ agenda (Petrie & South, 2013; Haacke, 2015). The central ‗audience of legitimation‘ 
in this phase is especially Aung San Suu Kyi and her Burmese followers and international 
supporters (Zarni, 2013).  
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Chapter 3.3 traces the emergence of the politics of ‗victimhood‘ as a source of 
legitimacy by examining the 2012 outbreak ‗inter-communal‘ violence in Rakhine State 
(Leider, 2018; Prasse-Freemen, 2014), the establishment of the ‗Annan Commission‘ 
(Advisory Commission on Rakhine State. 2017), and the ‗deflection‘ of the accountability 
debate (Mahoney, 2018; Lubina, 2018). The United Nations‘ motives, in light of the 
escalating ‗Rohingya crisis‘, are interrogated utilising the ―Two Faces of the United Nations‘ 
and, drawing on the notion of ‗audiences of legitimation, the United Nations legitimation 
processes in the context of the United Nations Human Rights Upfront Initiative (Lynch, 2017; 
Mahoney, 2018), with the ‗audience of legitimation‘ increasingly being the Rohingya 
movement. While there was rising and pointed criticism of Aung San Suu Kyi and her 
civilian-based government in light of the ‗Rohingya crisis,‘ the United Nations‘ legitimising 
beliefs in train since the 2011 democratic opening were fundamentally intact. The 
partnership between the international community, including the United Nations, and the 
newly-elected Myanmar government would find expression in terms of the establishment of 
the so-called ‗Annan Commission‘, a ‗national entity‘ established to identify the factors that 
have resulted in violence, displacement and underdevelopment in northern Rakhine State.    
In Chapters 3.4 and 3.5, tracing the above now-competing sources of legitimacy, I hone 
in on the 2016 ‗State-sponsored‘ violence (UNHRC, 2017), the establishment of the UN-
mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar (OHCHR, 2017), and the ‗foregrounding‘ of the 
accountability debate (British Broadcasting Corporation. 2016; Al Jazeera, 2017; Waduge, 
2017; Moulin, 2017; Aron & Gilmore, 2017). The United Nations‘ motives, in light of the 
events of 9 October 2016, are interrogated utilising the ―Two Faces of the United Nations‘. 
Furthermore, drawing on the notion of ‗audiences of legitimation, I examine the United 
Nations‘ legitimation processes in the context of the establishment of the United Nations 
Fact-Finding Mission to Myanmar. The key ‗audience of legitimation‘ is the ‗Rohingya 
movement‘, This is signalled by the use of the term ‗genocide‘ by the then-Chairperson of 
the International Fact-finding Mission (IFFM). While, the key ‗audience of legitimation‘ is the 
‗Rohingya movement‘ the identity of the audience of legitimation is ultimately itself a 
contested question, significantly within the United Nations itself.  I argue that the resolution 
can also be couched within the international community‘s liberal peacebuilding agenda, a 
key constituency of the United Nations‘ legitimation processes being the Myanmar 






The politics behind the establishment of the UN-mandated fact-
finding mission  
3.1 General Remarks  
By way of departure, it stands to question: What is the nature of Myanmar‘s strategic 
context? What are the attributes of the United Nations-mandated fact-finding mission to 
Myanmar? How can the interface between Myanmar‘s strategic context, domestic (and 
international) human rights fact-finding, and the ‗accountability debate‘ be characterised? But 
crucially, how has this strategic context, if at all, played a ‗constitutive‘ role in relation to the 
UN-mandated fact-finding mission? With a view to operationalizing a ‗dynamic‘ conception of 
international human rights fact-finding, this research study demonstrates how a Myanmar‘s 
strategic context has not only played a constitutive role in the establishment of the UN 
mission, but how the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar, as part and parcel of 
these discursive processes, both challenges and reinstates various political compromises 
and agendas. The analysis bears out that several influential events/periods – characterised 
by the emergence and contestation of two audiences of legitimation – have influenced the 
eventual establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar.     
3.2 The politics of personality as a source of legitimacy: the debate on the UN 
Commission of Inquiry, the 2011 ‘Burmese Spring’, and the ‘backgrounding’ of 
accountability  
… Policy decisions over whether to sanction or to engage, to provide aid or to 
isolate, signify the key dilemmas to which governments, corporations, 
international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are 
faced with in their response to the crisis of poor governance and instability in 
Myanmar  (Roberts, 2006).  
… relying on a victim-perpetrator framework to frame official investigations of the 
past injustice plays into the fear that such investigations will become paralysing 
and undermine the pursuit of political reconciliation or ongoing reform (Leebaw, 
2011:17).  
In The Lady and the Generals: Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma‟s struggle for freedom, 
Peter Popham (2016:268) describes how, in their never-ending war against ethnic peoples 
on the borders, ―the crimes committed by the Burmese army have been closely documented 
by brave investigators and collected in many chilling reports‖. UN special human rights 
rapporteurs struggled with scant success to jolt the regime‘s conscience ―by publishing 
details of these crimes‖. Nothing worked until 2009 when President Omar al-Bashir of 
Sudan, formerly a brigadier in the Sudanese army, was indicted by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in The Hague for his alleged crimes, ―not dissimilar to those which the Burmese 
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army was accused of‖, in Darfur (2016:268). This was the first time a sitting head of state 
had been indicted by the Court.12 It was not surprising that prominent voices lobbied loudly 
for Myanmar‘s generals to get the Omar al-Bashir treatment (2016:268). However, there was 
no indictment, and no further steps were taken towards launching one.   
Since independence in 1948, the Myanmar state has battled dozens of different armed 
secessionist movements, ―and none of those conflicts have been resolved in favour of a 
rebel group‖: ―Among the many ethno-linguistic groups that have taken up arms against the 
government, the largest and most tenacious has been the Karen‖ (Robinson, 2010:472). 
―The Panglong Conference of 1947, hosted in the town of Panglong in Shan State,‖ 
Dukalskis (2017:722) highlights, ―brought together leaders of various ethnic groups, 
including the Burmese, Chin, Kachin, and Shan‖. ―The aim‖, Dukalskis continues, ―was to 
discuss independence and post-independence political arrangements, and the end result 
was the Panglong Agreement, signed February 12, 1947‖ (Dukalskis, 2017:722). The 
military‘s conviction of the military that  
… they are charged with an immutable responsibility to uphold Myanmar's unity 
and sovereignty is a genuine belief and should not be dismissed as simple 
propaganda (Roberts, 2006:48).  
The overarching political calculus was, according to Peter Popham, that 
… the military must stay in power to protect the nation from disintegration: that 
was the mantra … But the wars were never won but dragged on and on, so there 
was neither cause nor opportunity for the military to return to their barracks. 
Burma was in a permanent state of civil war, and this justified every form of 
abuse and repression (Popham, 2016:xxvi).     
The tatmadaw‟s military operations have for many years been seen to involve systematic 
violations of human rights. Crimes such as arbitrary arrest, torture, or forced labour already 
featured centrally in the work on Myanmar by human rights organizations in the 1980s, and 
these and many other apparent human rights violations, to a certain extent, continue to 
preoccupy the United Nations. However, in the 1990s even critical assessments of the 
tatmadaw‟s military operations did not generally charge Myanmar‘s junta with mass 
atrocities: ―This changed in the 2000s, as the focus of international concern shifted towards 
the tatmadaw‘s military offensives then waged in Kayin (Karen) State and Bago Division‖ 
(Haacke, 2016:804). Not only have there been several in depth assessments of the 
international responses to Myanmar‘s human right‘s record,13 but the exact substance, form, 
                                                          
12 The International Criminal Court was established through the Rome Statute, which ―creates a 
permanent international court, stipulates hoe the Court shall conduct its proceedings and outlines how 
states shall cooperate with the Court‖ (Nouwen, 2012:173).  
13 ―Despite these allegations, Myanmar‘s former or current political-military leaders have not faced 
significant scrutiny or pressure from international organizations and the major powers‖ (Haacke, 
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scope and trajectory of international approach(es) have been the subject of on-going 
negotiation and evolution based on an array of (strategic and other) factors. An illuminating 
gauge of Myanmar‘s strategic context, which will be examined in this research study, is the 
UN Secretary General‘s Good Offices Mandate and how states have positioned themselves 
vis-à-vis this mandate which, now in its twenty fifth year, represents one of ―the longest such 
diplomatic efforts in the history of the world organization‖ (Magnusson & Pedersen, 2012:1). 
The UN mission has expanded. This has not only empowered new actors but has also 
created new constituencies.   
The person who arose as the international face of the democracy movement, Aung 
San Suu Kyi, was a newcomer to politics who had only of late returned to Burma following 
her academic studies in Britain (Zarni & Taneja, 2015:48). ―As a political prisoner for almost 
fifteen years‖, Suu Kyi was widely praised for her ―moral and physical courage‖, her 
―unwavering commitment to the principles of universal human rights‖ and her ―steadfast 
advocacy of peaceful political change‖ (Selth, 2017). She had headed the executive 
committee of the National League for Democracy (NLD), the democratic opposition, as 
National Secretary, and even at times when communications between her and the 
committee were prohibited and prevented her views, or those alleged to be hers, to be 
publicly voiced, they have influenced policy, as members of the committee have explained 
(Steinberg, 2010:39). In certain spheres, criticisms of her policies abroad have been 
opposed by charges that one cannot condemn her positions because she is not able to 
defend herself (Steinberg, 2010:39).  
Advocacy of human security dominated Myanmar policy discussions and media 
coverage. According to Zarni (2013), this was ―because other Western interests in Burma 
were not deemed very important‖. Furthermore, the West was stuck in its ―choice method‖ of 
―anointing a single voice – that is, Aung San Suu Kyi – as the sole voice of the voiceless 
Burmese people, ‗the hope of Burma‘‖ (Zarni, 2013). This has often meant that especially 
Western Nations, for whom the default position was non-engagement, have been very 
critical of the Good Offices mandate, which has generally striven for a policy of ‗engagement‘ 
with the Military dictatorship.14 Sanctions (since 1997, extended in 2004 and 2008) have 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2016:807). The UNSC never ―came close to referring the situation in Myanmar to the ICC … the 
General Assembly has adopted resolutions, which have concluded in a call to protect civilians and to 
put an end to the military operations targeting civilians in the ethnic areas … Also, the UN Human 
Rights Council  (HRC) in the 2000s strengthened its message of concern, but ultimately it only called 
on Naypyidaw to undertake a full, transparent, effective impartial, and independent national 
investigation into all reports of human rights violations and to bring to justice those responsible in 
order to end impunity‖ (Haacke, 2016:808). 
14 The politics surrounding the Good Offices mandate has been unpicked by Anna Magnusson & 
Morten B. Pedersen (2012), who argue that it ―has frequently seemed as if the good offices have 
been scapegoated for the collective failure of Myanmar‘s opposition and the international community 
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been one instrument employed by the international community in response to the gross 
violation of human rights in Myanmar. Although  
there has been a living debate about the impact on sanctions (with both sides 
having honest arguments), generally it must be admitted that the sanctions failed 
to produce anticipated results (…Myanmar‘s transition to democracy) due to non-
participation of Asian neighbours in the sanctions scheme and the xenophobic 
nature of Burmese regime (Lubina, 2018:82).  
―The coercive control of state behaviour‖, Cronin (2002:65) argues, is likely ―the most 
important intergovernmental function of the UN‖, requiring ―the use of military and economic 
sanctions, something that only states can apply effectively‖. Since Myanmar commenced its 
transition from a military government to a nominally civilian-led one in 2010, ‗national 
reconciliation‘ has become a pervasive concept amongst its politicians and champions for 
peace. The 2010 election was seen as an vital opening for dialogue and cooperation, as well 
as a potential tool for peace in a country ravaged by more than 60 years of civil war 
(Sawatzky, 2018). Apart from the 2010 election, the new government, led by the Union 
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) under U Thein Sein, started implementing several 
reforms, including, among others, ―greater freedom of the press, association and assembly; 
the release of political prisoners; and the opening-up of the political sphere – though in a 
limited fashion‖ (Dosch & Jatswan, 2015:100). More significantly, these reforms enabled 
Myanmar to repair its damaged relations with the West, particularly the United States and 
the EU (Dosch & Jatswan, 2015:100). However, while ―Myanmar‘s military and current 
regime have opted for organised forgetting of abuses and blanket amnesty for past crimes 
committed by the state‖ (Dukalskis, 2015:3), the  
… question of how to come to terms with Burma‘s legacies of violence and 
human rights abuses has been on the agenda of several domestic and 
international civil society groups, scholars, and the United Nations (Dukalskis, 
2015:3).   
The locus of debate being the United Nations Security Council, these efforts reached a 
climactic turning-point in 2010 when the debate on a UN Commission of Inquiry gathered 
unprecedented momentum, bringing into sharp focus – to use Cronin‘s (2002) turn of phrase 
– the ―Two Faces of the United Nations‘. In March 2010, following years of pressure to 
investigate Myanmar's government for its human rights violations, Tomas Ojea Quintana, the 
United Nations special rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar, ―called for the establishment 
of a UN Commission of Inquiry into Myanmar's violations of international humanitarian and 
human rights law‖ (Tan, 2012:1653). He repeated this appeal a year later in March 2011 that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to induce the military regime to democratize. And with everyone now clamoring to claim credit for the 
recent reforms, the actor that has received the least credit seems to be the UN‖ (Magnusson & 
Pedersen, 2012).  
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―a Commission would have investigated reports of violations of international humanitarian 
and human rights law in Myanmar, and consequently recommend further action to address 
the violations‖ (Tan, 2012:1653). At one point, many countries, including the United States,  
embraced the creation of a UN inquiry into Myanmar's violations of human rights, with some 
nations questioning the value of such a commission and others not voicing their support 
(Tan, 2012:1654).  For instance,  
… India pointed out that such an action would be ‗counter productive‘ and may 
produce adverse effects on the country's population.[…] Although Japan is 
considering backing a Commission, other Asian nations did not join the call for 
an investigation. China actively campaigned against the establishment of a 
Commission by urging UN officials and leaders of European and Asian 
governments to oppose the initiative.[…] In particular, China put pressure on the 
United States' support of an inquiry into Myanmar (Tan, 2012:1654-1655).  
On October 28, 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publicly confirmed the 
United States' support for the establishment of ―an international commission of inquiry 
through close consultations with our friends, allies, and other partners at the United Nations‖ 
(quoted in Tan, 2012:1654-1655). Despite popular Western support for the Commission, 
however, the process never transpired, unlike the past Commissions that have been 
established by the Security Council. In a report by Harvard Law School's International 
Human Rights Clinic, international law experts pressed for the UN Security Council to 
establish a Commission for Myanmar, contending that the enormity of violations are 
comparable to – or are even greater than – those in the former Yugoslavia and Darfur 
(International Human Rights Clinic, 2009:2). Various explanations have been advanced for 
why the UN Commission of Inquiry was never established.15 It is also the contention of this 
research study  that the non-establishment of the fact-finding mission can be explained in 
terms of the dominance of intergovernmentalism as a force in world politics (Cronin, 2002), 
but for very different reasons to those articulated by Tan (2012).  According to Mathieson 
(2018), international effusion for the democratic transition  
… had no place for accountability measures or transitional justice, as the 
response to the nationwide peace process made clear: diplomats, donors, and 
political leaders wanted no form of accountability for past crimes (Mathieson, 
2018).  
The argument to ‗protect‘ Myanmar‘s ‗democratic transition‘ has frequently found 
expression in various ways, including the ‗peace versus justice‘ argument.  In this debate, 
peace was seen as ―a prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy, the promotion of 
                                                          
15 For example, according to Audrey Tan (2012:1655), by ―examining the history and structure of the 
UN Security Council commissions and discussing the establishment of Commissions into both the 
former Yugoslavia and Darfur, we can gain further insight into reasons why a Commission for 
Myanmar was never established‖.  
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development, and the protection of human rights‖ (Dosch & Sidhu, 2015:100), an approach, 
moreover, that ―does not seem to factor in the possibility of backward steps and is based on 
a scenario of ongoing, linear political and economic reforms‖ (Dosch & Sidhu, 2015:85). Not 
only was there the incentive of international and national cross-cooperation,16 according to 
Zarni & Taneja (2015:47), far-reaching international admiration for Suu Kyi‘s leadership 
certainly helped centre international policy on the domestic requirements and processes for 
democratic reform, ―and ultimately legitimised Suu Kyi‘s long-standing insistence on dialogue 
with the regime‖ (Zarni & Taneja, 2015:47).  According to Andrew Selth (2017), ―there was 
[also] an element of political opportunism on both sides‖. In as much as Aung San Suu Kyi 
was key to legitimating the Myanmar government in the eyes of the international 
community,17 the politics of personality legitimised the international community‘s peace-
building aspirations, which included a host of targeted ‗audiences,‘ with Norway playing the 
leading role.18  These ‗audiences‘ throw light on delegated representative authority as a key 
aspect of legitimacy and legitimation processes. They also put a spotlight on how 
‗audiences‘ are produced in the first place. To quote Bexell & Jonsson (2018:129), 
audiences are not formed in advance of (de)legitimation processes, but rather are generated 
in the course of those processes and shaped by patterns of exclusion and inclusion.   
Apart from the international community‘s peacebuilding aspirations, which were also 
legitimised by the United Nations, there are a range of explanations (e.g. reactions to 
reforms) why Myanmar‘s democratic reforms elicited a recalibration of external relations. For 
example, according to Selth (2012:7), due to ―this more nuanced approach‖, Myanmar 
became much less of a barrier to the expansion of ―US relations with other Asia–Pacific 
countries‖. Bünte, Marco and Dosch‘s (2015:6) argue that building ―some kind of truce and a 
genuine reconciliation with the National League for Democracy (NLD) was a precondition for 
a recalibration of external relations‖. Therefore, since taking office, the Thein Sein 
                                                          
16 ―From a position of relative isolation, Myanmar has seen a tremendous change in engagement by 
broader actors within the international community, particularly major bilateral donors, the UN, and 
international NGOs. All of these actors have waded in with enthusiasm in an effort to address areas of 
tremendous need that are now accessible because of new openings. Perhaps the most dramatic 
example of this can be seen in the case of donors, including Australia, Finland, Japan, Norway, 
Switzerland, and the UK who have all announced substantial increases in bilateral assistance to be 
applied towards humanitarian, development and peacebuilding needs‖ (Clarke, 2013:15).     
17 As highlighted in the previous section, Egreteau insightfully highlights that, from its perspective, the 
post-junta leadership led by President Thein Sein saw the ―political consecration‖ of ‗The Lady‘ as an 
opportunity to ―restore its image in the eyes of the international community‖ (Egreteau, 2016:69). As 
Western governments began to review their sanctions policy as early as 2012 – once Aung San Suu 
Kyi was first elected to parliament – the wider diplomatic community reopened its doors to a Burmese 
state long treated as a pariah (Egreteau, 2016:7).  
18 Norway has maintained a distinct status in the country both as a result of its peacebuilding efforts 
and the legacy of the Peace Prize, an act which brought the political and security situation in 
Myanmar to global attention and prompted greater international pressure for Ms. Suu Kyi‘s release 
and for reforms both in governance and foreign policy as well as a halt to the ethnic conflicts in the 
country (Alexandra & Lanteigne, 2017:224).    
38 
 
government has endeavoured to mend its relationship with the foremost opposition party 
(Bünte, Marco and Dosch‘s, 2015:6). Understanding that he could only restore the country 
with the assistance of opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, U Thein Sein approached 
her and bid her to Naypyidaw on 17 August 2011 (Bünte et al., 2015:6). Her approval to the 
president‘s reform pathway was pivotal to making Western states end their economic 
sanctions (Bünte et al., 2015:6). A day later, she stated that she believed that ‗the president 
wants real change‘ (quoted in Bünte et al., 2015:6):  
In November 2011, the Thein Sein government amended the political-party 
registration law and the election law, which allowed the opposition leader to run 
in future elections (quoted in Bünte et al., 2015:6)  
Aung San Suu Kyi abandoned her ―confrontational approach‖ towards the regime and 
directed ―the opposition towards reconciliation‖ (Bünte et al., 2015:6).   
At the heart of the politics of personality as a legitimation strategy is the construction of 
Ang San Suu Kyi as paragon of human rights and democracy. According to Peter A. 
Coclanis (2018), Western Liberals projected their own hopes onto ‗the Lady‘. ―No living 
foreigner‖, according to David I Steinberg, ―has shaped contemporary United States policy 
toward a single country more than Aung San Suu Kyi‖ (Steinberg, 2010:36). The character of 
the charisma now associated with Aung San Suu Kyi varies by location (Steinberg, 2010:37). 
Internally in Myanmar, it seems to have originated initially from the aura attributed to her 
father and later to a combination of her father‘s renown and her own abilities (Steinberg, 
2010:37). Internationally, however, for those who have no emotional attachment to his 
significant part in Myanmar independence and the formation of the Union of Burma in 1948, 
it has been an outcome both of her own capacities and activities, ―her symbolic 
personification of democracy coupled with both a seeming and real vulnerability,‖ and ―the 
bumbling and often oppressive nature of the Burmese military leadership‖ (Steinberg, 
2010:37). Various authors have, however, painted a much more complicated relationship 
between United States and Aung San Suu Kyi (see Lubina, 2016).19 Key strategic centres of 
political influence (and audiences of legitimation) were, in order of importance,    
Aung San Suu Kyi and her Burmese followers and international supporters, 
individual and institutional, from grassroots to ‗high-level advocacy‘ (a loose 
global coalition of activists, advocates, lobbyists, and institutions in the fields of 
                                                          
19 In It‟s complicated: United States, Aung San Suu Kyi and U.S.-Burma relations, Michał Lubina 
(2016) has argued that until ―2011 Aung San Suu Kyi has been the point of reference for U.S. policy 
towards Burma/Myanmar. Her struggle with the Burmese military junta has attracted widespread 
attention and global affection towards her. As a result, Suu Kyi enjoyed unquestioned support from 
subsequent U.S. presidential administrations. This however, changed in 2011, when Suu Kyi was 
politically sacrificed during the U.S. pivot to Asia. Nevertheless, she faced it bravely and did not give 
in; just changed her tactics from confrontation to cooperation with the post-military regime. That gave 
her a stunning electoral victory in 2015 and power from behind-the-scenes in Myanmar. Suu Kyi‟s 
relations with Washington have remained cordial, yet complicated ever since‖.  
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Human Rights, Environment, Policy and Legislative Affairs, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Religion, Social Justice, and Women‘s Affairs); and ethnic 
minority advocates. Their work was grounded in liberal ideals including freedom, 
democracy and human rights, as well as non-violence and new 
environmental/ecological outlooks and ideas (Zarni, 2013).     
In the final analysis, the central ‗audience of legitimation‘ was especially Aung San Suu 
Kyi and her Burmese followers and international supporters. In as much as (the release of) 
Suu Kyi encouraged a discussion on the question of the appropriate accountability 
mechanisms, ‗The Lady‘ was ultimately pivotal to the abandonment of the notion:  ―Fear of 
being dragged to The Hague may well have persuaded the generals to improve their image. 
But the converse may also be true: once the risk of indictment had faded, thanks to Suu‘s 
intervention, the urgency of further reform dwindled away. After half a year of change, the 
process ground to a halt. Suu would not hear of any ICC indictment, and the generals new it. 
The panic was over‖ (Popham, 2017). International deference to Suu Kyi‘s leadership led to 
the ‗backgrounding‘ of the ‗accountability debate.‘20 In the context of ―efforts to manipulate 
the environmental structure by creating new audiences and new legitimating beliefs‖ 
(Suchman, 1995:587), the politics of personality, a mechanism for ‗backgrounding‘ the 
accountability debate, would have enduring political and strategic currency. Egreteau 
(2016:7) continues that, comparing  
popular yet chaotic and bloody revolts of the Arab world in the early 2010s and 
the Eurasian colored revolutions of the 2000s, a flurry of new books, reports and 
magazine covers appeared, praising the unexpected advent of a non-violent 
‗Burmese Spring‘.   
While introducing a new horizon of strategic and policy coordination between the 
international community and the Myanmar government,21 Myanmar‘s evolving strategic 
context would place the international community in the potentially dichotomous position of 
maintaining ‗credibility‘ in the eyes of two key political constituencies. It also ―marked the 
beginning of a divided approach to promotion of human rights in Myanmar within the UN 
                                                          
20 For a discussion on the ‗backgrounding‘ and ‗foregrounding‘ of questions of social justice in the 
context of international fact-finding, see Sharp (2016:4), who clarifies how fact-finding, as practiced by 
NGO heavyweights, can be thought of as an elite or hierarchical activity, among others, ―in terms of 
the problems to which global fact-finders tend to devote most of their attention and the ways in which 
the practices and methodologies  of fact-finding have tended over time, intentionally or not, to 
privilege certain questions of social justice over others‖.     
21 For example, in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Myanmar, Andrew Selth (2017:31) states 
that, although ―Myanmar continues to attract criticism from governments and organisations, for 
various reasons, one striking aspect of its re-emergence as an international actor in recent years has 
been the readiness of foreign countries to renew or strengthen ties with the country‘s armed forces 
and police. Before the advent of Thein Sein‘s reformist government, any relationship with the security 
forces was politically difficult, if not (in the case of some Western democracies) impossible. Yet, since 
2011 several governments, international institutions and private foundations have offered Myanmar 
aid in this sector. These approaches were enthusiastically welcomed by Naypyitaw and, albeit more 
cautiously, by Aung San Suu Kyi‖.   
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system‖ (Olsen, 2016:42). Apart from Aung San Suu Kyi and her Burmese followers and 
international supporters, the international community‘s recalibrated approach had a range of 
‗audiences.‘ The dramatic shift in US policy has been widely welcomed, but even 
experienced Myanmar-watchers have been unable to agree on what actually prompted 
Hillary Clinton‘s visit. It was variously described as a calculated move to leave behind the 
discredited policies of the Bush era, an effort to boost Thein Sein‘s standing and encourage 
the domestic reform process,  
… a gesture of support to Aung San Suu Kyi, part of a broader attempt by the 
Obama Administration to re-engage with the Asia–Pacific region — as outlined in 
the president‘s address to the Australian parliament that November […] — and a 
ploy by the US to score points in its strategic competition with China. Burma‘s 
shadowy defence relationship with North Korea has also been of concern (Selth, 
2012:9-10).   
A scientific consensus was also developing which gave additional authority or 
credibility to international peacebuilding efforts.22 The Civil Society Dialogue Network 
(CSDN) is a three year project funded by the Instrument for Stability of the European 
Commission aimed at facilitating dialogue on peacebuilding issues between civil society and 
the EU institutions. In a paper entitled Mapping of Myanmar Peacebuilding Civil Society – 
produced as background for the CSDN meeting entitled ‗Supporting Myanmar‘s Evolving 
Peace Processes: What Roles for Civil Society and the EU?‘ – Charles Petrie and Ashley 
South (2013:7), both independent consultants and writers, stress that ―the international 
community can support peace-building initiatives which build trust and confidence in the 
peace process, and at the same time test the sincerity of the Myanmar government and 
Army, and NSAGs to deliver the peace which citizens long for‖. It is also significant that the 
United Nations, especially by way of the Secretary-General‘s Good Offices mandate, 
indirectly and directly ‗legitimised‘ international peacebuilding efforts:   
It is fair to conclude that over the years the UN‘s good offices helped cultivate the 
ground for those shifts by making ―engagement‖ a less dirty word and 
highlighting to all sides the cost of maintaining their zero-sum positions 
(Magnusson & Pedersen, 2012:88).   
There are also various direct ways by which the United Nations legitimised 
international peacebuilding efforts. On the governmental level, institution-building between 
Norway and Myanmar in the area of peacebuilding has been high on the agenda (Alexandra 
                                                          
22 In this regard, ―epistemic communities can help formulate policies. Their role in this regard will 
depend on the reasons for which their advice is sought. In some cases, decision makers will seek 
advice to gain information which will justify or legitimate a policy that they wish to pursue for political 
ends. An epistemic community's efforts might thus be limited to working out the details of the policy, 
helping decision makers anticipate the conflicts of interest that would emerge with respect to 




& Lanteigne, 2017:224). Norway created the ―twin institutions of the Myanmar Peace 
Support Initiative (MPSI) and the Peace Donor Support Group (PDSG) in 2012 at the 
request of Myanmar authorities‖ (Alexandra & Lanteigne, 2017:224). The MPSI was initiated 
to engage with ―he Myanmar government, the country‘s military, as well as non-state armed 
and political groups, civil society actors and communities, as well as international actors‖, to 
deliver tangible support to ―the ceasefire process and emerging peace process‖ (Alexandra 
& Lanteigne, 2017:224). Crucially, in terms of its political-institutional bonds, the PDSG 
founding members included Norway, Australia, the United Kingdom, the European Union, 
the United Nations and the World  Bank, but later expanded to include Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Indonesia, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States of America by 2015 
(Olsen, 2016:supra note 7).   
In 2010, David I Steinberg (2010:50) indicated that many ―want to see justice done for 
the many egregious abuses that have been perpetrated on the Burmese peoples, but that is 
mostly unlikely under any scenario at this time‖. Clara Portela (2013), however, paints the 
key considerations and dilemmas faced by Europe and the United States – and posed by the 
evolving strategic context – at the time. Myanmar‘s rise from decades of military dictatorship 
poses ―the West with a dilemma‖ (Portela, 2013:36). While Europe and the United States are 
eager to  acknowledge the ―transition to democratic rule‖ and to  ensure that they secure an 
―economic toehold in a country with such immense natural resources‖, there are still major 
issues regarding Myanmar‘s human rights record, ―in particular the treatment of ethnic 
minorities such as the Muslim Rohingyas‖ (Portela, 2013:36). Circumstances for labourers in 
―Burmese mines, building sites and factories, including the use of forced labour,‖ Portela 
(2013:36) stresses, ―remain a real worry‖. To be relevant to all the social and political forces 
in Myanmar, what the European Union needs to do is ―to help them address their most 
pressing problems – and to be seen to be doing so‖ (Portela, 2013:36).        
3.3 The emergence of the politics of ‘victimhood’ as a source of legitimacy: 
‘Inter-communal’ violence in Rakhine State, the ‘Annan Commission’, and the 
‘deflection’ of the accountability debate     
In September 2016, the Myanmar government formed the Advisory Commission 
on Rakhine State. The inclusion of international members and the appointment 
of Kofi Annan as its chairman signalled that the central government recognized 
the value of international co-operation on Rakhine while buying the government 
time (Lambert, 2017:38).  
In September 2016, the Kofi Annan Foundation and the Office of the State Counsellor 
(Aung San Suu Kyi) established an Advisory Commission on Rakhine State to identify the 
factors that have resulted in violence, displacement and underdevelopment. The Advisory 
Commission on Rakhine State website describes the so-called Annan Commission – the 
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majority of whose members are from Myanmar – as a ‗national entity‘ and as a ―a neutral 
and impartial body which aimed to propose concrete measures for improving the welfare of 
all people in Rakhine state‖ (Kofi Annan Foundation, 2016). Yet, it was not mandated to 
investigate specific cases of alleged human rights violations and it was requested by the 
State Counsellor not to use the terms ‗Bengali‘ or ‗Rohingya‘ but in its place ‗the Muslim 
community in Rakhine‘ (House of Commons, 2018:17). With the onset of inter-communal 
violence in Myanmar, the crisis in Rakhine state became another sphere of strategic and 
policy coordination and negotiation,23 eventuating in the establishment of the so-called ‗Kofi 
Annan Commission.‘ Mahoney stresses that 
The international community … wholeheartedly supported the Rakhine Advisory 
Commission, starting with Aung San Suu Kyi‘s first announcement of its creation 
(Mahoney, 2018:31).   
While the Commission‘s is framed ‗to identify the factors that have resulted in violence, 
displacement and underdevelopment,‘ a more nuanced analysis of the establishment of the 
Annan Commission takes into account the contingencies of Myanmar‘s evolving strategic 
context, especially the emergence of the politics of ‗Rohingya‘ victimhood.    
In  June  2012,  a  little  over  a  year  after  the  new  quasi-civilian  government came 
to power, riots broke out in western Rakhine state after the rape  and  murder  of  a  
Buddhist  girl  by  three  Muslim  men: ―Rakhine Buddhists retaliated by killing ten Muslims in 
an attack on a bus, and the fighting quickly spread between Rakhine Buddhists and 
Rohingya Muslims, with Rohingya Muslims suffering a disproportionately greater loss of life 
and property‖ (Walton & Hayward, 2014:7-8). In October 2012, violence again burst across 
Rakhine state, ―bringing the death toll to at least 200, and with more than 100 thousand 
displaced‖ (Walton & Hayward, 2014:7-8). Although  the  conflict  in  Rakhine  state  initially  
appeared  to  be  an   isolated incident fueled by specific regional tensions, ―violence 
directed  at  Muslims  soon  appeared  in  other  parts  of  the  country. In  the  central 
Myanmar town of Meikhtila (in ethnic Burman territory),‖ protests on March 2013 gave rise to 
many deaths ―as Buddhists burned Muslim homes,  mosques,  and  schools  in  response  to  
a  jewelry  store  dispute  and  the  murder  of  a  Buddhist  monk  by  a  group  of  Muslims‖ 
(Walton & Hayward, 2014:7-8). Walton & Hayward continue that:    
Anti-Muslim  violence  also  occurred  in  May 2013 in the town of Lashio, located 
in Shan state (an area with active  armed,  ethnic-opposition  groups  that  
occasionally  clash  with  the  Burmese  military).  Another  flare-up  of  riots  
                                                          
23 ―As a joint project of the Government of Myanmar and the Kofi Annan Foundation, the costs of the 
Advisory Commission were shared. The Government of Myanmar covered a significant proportion of 
the costs; the balance was mobilised by the Kofi Annan Foundation from governmental partners. The 
Kofi Annan Foundation received support for its Rakhine Commission work from the Governments of 
Denmark and Norway, as well as from the Swedish Postcode Fund‖ (Kofi Annan Foundation, 2016).   
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occurred  in  and around Thandwe, a town in Rakhine state, in early October 
2013. President Thein Sein was already en route to the region when the violence 
erupted, and he visited affected areas and met with local officials (Walton & 
Hayward, 2014:8).   
With the onset of ‗intercommunal‘ violence in Rakhine State in 2012, scholarly orthodoxies 
were fundamentally reshaped by the logic of ‗Rohingya‘ victimhood. In Moral Quandary in 
Myanmar studies: Looking at the Rohingya crisis as an outsider, Hunter Marston (2017), 
who explores the divergent perspectives of international scholars and the people of 
Myanmar, avers that analysts and scholars of Myanmar  ―seem split on the issue‖. While 
many struggle to reconcile their support for the democratically elected government with their 
consternation at its inability to check the rise of radical Buddhist nationalism and the violence 
that has plagued Rakhine State, others have been jolted into new activist postures and 
ready to depart from ―the traditional neutrality and detached objectivity prized in the realm of 
academia‖ (Marston, 2017). Tensions started to emerge between the existing legitimating 
beliefs and Myanmar‘s changing strategic context. After sectarian violence broke out 
between the Muslim Rohingya and Buddhist Rakhine in western Myanmar in 2013,  
a clear narrative developed. Given that thousands of Rohingya were killed and 
hundreds of thousands were forced from their homes, and given that these 
numbers significantly outstripped the life of property lost by the Rakhine, 
common sense began to congeal around a general understanding: the 
Rohingya, the most marginalised of Burma‘s Muslims, are the clear victims 
(Prasse-Freeman, 2014:117).   
According to Leider (2018:104), post-2012 accounts on the ‗Rohingya‘ built on the track 
record established by the Western human rights reports from the 1990s, ―which commodified 
Rohingya victimhood after the exodus of the 1991-1992 as a narrative of helpless and 
discriminated Muslim minority‖. The dominant account of a binary conflict between a 
Buddhist state‘s security apparatus backed by xenophobic nationalists on the one hand, and 
a disenfranchised Muslim populations on the other ―has supported a description of Rohingya 
victimhood‖ that currently possesses a ―hegemonic grip‖ over Rohingya-related debates and 
conversations among ―diplomats, political leaders, the media and the international public‖ 
(Leider, 2018:104).  
Worked up by human rights defenders, the accounts of Rohingya victimhood early on 
resulted in calls for retributive justice directed at the state and security forces (Leider, 
2018:101). The Rohingya were increasingly called ‗the most persecuted minority in the 
world‖, a label the origins of which was increasingly attributed (rightly or wrongly) to the 
United Nations (Ibrahim, 2016). Rallying around the politics of victimhood, the onset of inter-
communal violence occasioned the rise of a new strategic centre of political influence.  
According to Jacque Leider, there has been a rise in ―a new front of international Rohingya 
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caretakers (NGOs, think tanks, academics, and legal experts) who have used a purely 
human rights-based approach to indict the Myanmar authorities about discrimination of the 
Rohingya Muslims‖ (Leider, 2018:107). The international community‘s legitimation processes 
took on a new quality with the rise of a new front of international Rohingya caretakers. In 
contrast to the ‗targeted audiences,‘ ‗constructed‘ by international efforts peacebuilding 
efforts, these ‗audiences‘ are ‗self-appointed‘. This draws attention not only to the fact that 
they do not have institutionalised channels to participate in decision making at a GGI – and 
must influence the United Nations through other means – but to the fact that groups may 
constitute themselves as self-appointed audiences, even when they are not – in comparison 
to targeted audiences – recognised as an audience by the agents of (de)legitimation.    
In light of the escalating ‗Rohingya crisis,‘ tensions would arise between the two 
strategic centres of influence highlighted thus far, which would find expression, at least 
partly, within the UN system itself in terms of the United Nations Human Rights Upfront 
(HRUF) Initiative,24 the focal point of debate being between the human rights and the 
development components of the United Nations.25 In 2015, The Myanmar Times captured 
the controversies within the United Nations as follows:    
A fierce debate within the highest echelons of the United Nations over how to 
deal with Myanmar on the issue of the Rohingya is moving from behind closed 
doors into the public domain, casting doubts over whether the UN body has 
formulated a coherent strategy (Dinmore, 2015).    
The article, quoting a UN official, pits Prince Zeid against Renata Lok-Dessalien in no 
uncertain terms: ―It is Prince Zeid versus Dessallien and she is feeling the heat. She is a big 
supporter of the Rakhine chief minister and has bought the government line‖. In The Failed 
UN Mission in Myanmar, The Irrawaddy, assessing, among others, the sudden termination 
of Renata Lok-Dessallien stint as UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, indicates that 
dependable sources testified that Lok-Dessallien had been critiqued for neglecting 
                                                          
24
 Too often has the United Nations system failed to mobilize all of its tools to protect populations from 
serious human rights violations: ―A notable example is the UN‘s inadequate human rights response in 
Sri Lanka in 2009, during the conclusion of the country‘s long-running civil war. In 2013, the UN 
launched the Human Rights up Front (HRUF) initiative to avoid such failures in the future and to 
create a more accountable, coherent and prepared system … As presented by the UN, Human Rights 
up Front has three interlocking goals: (1) to transform the UN‘s organizational culture, (2) to make 
operational changes that frame the UN‘s work on human rights protection as a priority for all UN 
entities and (3) to empower UN officials as they work with member states on achieving the 
aforementioned goals‖ (Kurtz, 2015:4).  
25
 While the Resident Coordinator system ―is ‗owned‘ by the entire system, it nevertheless remains 
managed by the UN Development Programme, the central development actor of the UN‖ (Kurtz, 
2015:28). In The Contribution of Human Rights to Protecting People in Conflict, Michael Keating and 
Richard Bennett (:350) state that ―[o]ne of the key areas of tension is the widely held view that 
advocating for human rights will jeopardize the international community‘s relationship with the host 
government. Due to tensions with the government that can result from human rights advocacy, 
international actors, including the UN, often prioritise other areas of work, such as political, 
humanitarian, and development agendas.‖ 
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Myanmar‘s human rights situation. The mission‘s ―tread-softly approach‖ has been 
challenged by some other senior officials, primarily U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Zeid Ra‘ad Al Hussein and former Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson, who was 
mandated with implementing the former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon‘s U.N. Human 
Rights Up Front Initiative, ―which called for placing the promotion of human rights at the 
center of the U.N.‘s work in the field‖ (Lynch, 2017). But they faced, according to Lynch, stiff 
resistance from United Nations Development Programme‘s (UNDP) former executive 
director, Helen Clark,  
…and the former special envoy, Vijay Nambiar, according to former U.N. officials 
and internal U.N. documents reviewed by FP. In private meetings, Clark and 
Nambiar repeatedly argued that frank criticism of Myanmar‘s human rights 
conduct would be counterproductive and that the government was doing its best 
to improve, the officials said (Lynch, 2017).  
In Andrew Gilmour‘s (2014) words, HRUF provides ―conceptual cover and institutional 
backing‖ for activism driven not only by senior UN officials, but also by civil society and 
member states. The HRUF initiative draws attention not only to the self-appointed audiences 
of the United Nations in light of the onset of the 2012 intercommunal violence, but to UN 
efforts to ‗target‘ these audiences. In spite of this tension and these contestations, however, 
there are various reasons why they did not lead to the ‗foregrounding‘ of the ‗accountability 
debate.‘            
In January 2014, a violent episode took place in Du Chee Yar Tan (DCYT), a village in 
Rakhine state that, according to Walton & Hayward, 2014:8), ―underscores the complex 
politics surrounding incidents of religious violence‖. At the time, President U Thein Sein had 
agreed to the opening of an Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in 
a series of pledges to US President Barack Obama,  
… with the president‘s office taking steps towards agreeing to a full office of the 
rights organization to help with capacity building and monitoring and reporting. 
Soon that initiative was delayed over disagreements between the government 
and the UN over the alleged massacre in a village in Arakan State called Du 
Chee Yar Tan (Mathieson, 2018).26  
It is uncertain what impact the differences over Du Chee Yar Tan had ―on institutional 
trust in the government‘s cooperating with the UN rights regime (Mathieson, 2018). The 
government responded to ensuing criticism of these attacks by nominating a new Chief 
Minister to lead Rakhine State, ―and his job was to bring the situation under control and 
rebuild some broken relationships‖ (Mathieson, 2018). He reopened the space in central 
Rakhine for humanitarian operations, but always holding to the same discourse: ―the 




internationals were at fault for insufficiently caring about the ethnic Rakhine population‖ 
(Mahoney, 2018:18). In light of this ‗legitimacy critique‘ by the Myanmar government, UN 
framings of the ‗Rohingya crisis‘ soon became increasingly beholden to the argument for 
‗protecting‘ Myanmar‘s democratic transition. According to Liam Mahoney (2018:18):  
The crisis in Rakhine State is complex, but international actors have focused on 
a one-dimensional analysis focused on the aspect of local intercommunal conflict 
with the ethnic Rakhine, and deliberately underemphasized the more important 
and influential dynamic of the decades-long national and military strategy of 
segregation, confinement, deliberate impoverishment, and ethnic cleansing.  
The argument for ‗protecting‘ the democratic transition made the policy of silence 
sound like a positively good thing. It was all very convenient for everyone, serving neatly to 
avoid tougher problems: ―A fundamental problem was that this approach treated the state 
actors as partners in responding to a humanitarian crisis, rather than perpetrators of the 
human rights abuses causing that crisis‖ (Mahoney, 2018:23). This contrasts with Leider‘s 
(2018:102) line of argument, according to whom, it is striking that matters of peace and 
reconciliation have been ―painfully absent from conversations on communal relations in 
Rakhine State‖, while they have shaped ―the core of political conversations on promoting 
democracy in Myanmar‘s ethnopolitical eco-system for many decades‖.  
This ‗partnership model‘ would find expression in terms of the establishment of the so-
called ‗Annan Commission.‘ Even though Aung San Suu Kyi credibility was not, as yet, 
‗conceptually‘-hinged to the ‗Rohingya crisis,‘ a defining feature of this period was the fact 
that Myanmar‘s ‗democratic transition‘ and the need to address the ‗Rohingya issue‘ were 
seen as ‗mutually-dependent.‘ In 2013, the then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stressed 
that the South-east Asian country must continue its democratic transition and overcome 
inter-communal violence that is threatening it (United Nations, 2013). The 2014 US human 
rights report indeed describes the humanitarian and human rights crisis in Rakhin State as 
―the most troubling exception and threat to the country‘s progress‖ (US State Department 
2013: 1) (quoted in Haacke, 2015:66). The brunt of the criticism prior to the elections was 
levelled against the military. In 2015, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid 
Ra‘ad Al Hussein warned that guaranteeing ―accountability for the military will be a key test 
for the transition‖ (OHCHR, 2015). Obama had categorically linked one to the other, arguing 
that democratization itself is contingent on resolution of the Rohingya issue (Choudhury, 
2017). At this stage, however, the State Department stressed that, although it is ―without 
question that [the Rohingya] continue to face persecution, we did not determine that it was 
on the level of genocide‖ (Lewis, 2016). This indicates that the ‗Rohingya‘ movement was 
increasingly a targeted audience, one with – as indicated above – increasing political-
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institutional links within the UN itself. This changed with the 2016 general elections and the 
election of Aung San Suu Kyi as State Counsellor and the de facto leader of Myanmar.   
In 2016, in an article for the Brookings Institute entitled Aung San Suu Kyi‟s new 
government: What to look for in Myanmar, Lex Rieffel (2016) lists 5 policy areas that can 
serve as measures of the new government‘s progress. For the first ‗policy area‘ Relations 
with the armed forces and the peace process, Rieffel stresses that since ―the NLD election 
victory last November, Daw Suu has worked hard to obtain support from the military 
establishment for the NLD‘s policy agenda‖. Rieffel (2016) highlights that by  
… all accounts, she has met fierce resistance and has had to accept many 
troubling compromises, as petty as where the swearing in of President Htin Kyaw 
on March 30 took place. But the military is important to sustain domestic peace. 
This won‘t come easily. Many rounds of negotiations led by the government-
supported Myanmar Peace Center yielded a partial agreement last October, but 
attacks by both sides have continued without interruption.  
Rieffel (2016) continues that there is ―no outreach to the Rohingya minority community, and 
not a single Muslim is included in the new government‖, concluding that peace ―ultimately 
depends on creating a meaningful federal structure that is grounded in amendments to the 
2008 Constitution‖.  
Burma/Myanmar seems to be a perfect ground for transitional justice as it has been a 
playground for civil war since 1948 (in last three decades limited to Borderlands) and a long-
failed transition to democracy that seemed to finally succeed in 2015.  According to Lubina 
(2018:78), ―the prospects of achieving (some sort of) transitional justice in Burma/Myanmar 
are today as remote as they had been before 2011‖. Lubina continues, however, that the 
post-2015 political context in Myanmar has produced circumstances where transitional 
justice is neither desired by the majority of political actors nor conceivable in the predictable 
future: ―There are several important political reasons behind this agenda, most of which can 
be classified as a ―peace‖ argumentation within the peace vs justice debate‖ (Lubina, 
2018:89). First of all, NLD government has ―prioritised peace and reconciliation‖ and focused 
on ―reconciliation between leaders of the NLD and the military‖; in this approach, 
reconciliation is understood as between the NLD (the former democratic opposition) and the 
military (Thomson, 2016)‖ (Lubina, 2018). Lubina (2018) continues that  
Suu Kyi herself has repeated her message about ―healing past wounds‖ between 
military and opposition many times … Moreover, Suu Kyi‘s stance on restoring 
peace in the country (ending the smouldering, yet still active conflict on the 
peripheries) is vague (neither she nor her officials have not made any concrete 
statements) and based on the principle of non-irritating the military.   
Thus far, Lubina concludes, ―this has not produced breakthrough results as Tatmadaw 
continues its traditional, violent approach to solving ethnic problems which backfires [on] Suu 
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Kyi (particularly on the Rohingya issue)‖.27 Faced with demands for legitimization both 
domestically and internationally, Aung San Suu Kyi established the Annan Commission. As 
highlighted above, the credibility of Aung San Suu Kyi depended increasingly upon her 
ability to resolve the Rohingya crisis. Significantly, the Commission, as an area of national 
and international cooperation and negotiation, also reflects certain political compromises 
struck between the international community and the Myanmar government. The 
establishment of the Commission reflects the increasing pressure on the military and – by 
extension – on Myanmar‘s civilian-based government due to the politics of Rohingya 
victimhood, with which – an examined in the next section – it soon became entangled. Liam 
Mahoney argues that the ‗Annan Commission‘ was ―a mechanism designed by the state, not 
to resolve the Rohingya crisis, but to deflect the pressures they faced about this crisis‖ 
(Mahoney, 2018:31).  
A BBC article published on 6 December 2016 gave strength to this argument when, in the 
aftermath of the event of 9 October 2016, it claimed that ―the Former UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan says he would not describe the violence committed against Myanmar‘s Rohingya 
minority as ‗genocide‘‖ (BBC, 2016). Given the key strategic changes in Myanmar‘s strategic 
context at the time, however, it is more likely that the key ‗audience‘ at the time of its 
establishment were key powerbrokers within the United Nations architecture itself. In Can 
Kofi Annan‟s Commission Solve the Rohingya Conundrum, Kipgen (2016) argues that 
the―timing of Annan‘s visit is important for the Myanmar government because it happens at a 
time when the attention of the international community, including the media, is relatively 
focused on the Southeast Asian nation‖:  
First, Annan‘s visit comes right after the highly vaunted 21st century Panglong 
conference where the Myanmar government is seeking to secure peace and 
reconciliation with the country‘s ethnic minorities. Several dignitaries, including 
Ban Ki-moon, the incumbent UN secretary general and successor of Annan 
himself, attended the conference … Second, the commission‘s first visit also 
comes days before Suu Kyi‘s planned visit to the United States, where she will 
meet President Barack Obama and also address the 71st session of the UN 
General Assembly. 
While there was rising and pointed criticism of Aung San Suu Kyi and her civilian-based 
government in light of the ‗Rohingya crisis,‘ the legitimising beliefs in train since the 2011 
                                                          
27 Even before assuming her role as State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi was the subject of 
international scrutiny.  In an article for The Guardian entitled Why is Aung San Suu Kyi silent on the 
plight of the Rohingya people?, Sara Perria asks: ―how could such an iconic figure of human rights be 
so reticent when it comes to defending an ethnic minority from her own country?‖ Perria argues that 
―Burma‘s opposition leader appears to be cowed by her need to dampen ethnic tensions and win 
votes from an electorate in the thrall of Islamophobia‖, concluding that: ―Aung San Suu Kyi might 
decide to maintain her silence, calculating it is in her interests to have the government on its own to 
deal with any backlash across the country but especially in Rakhine as the elections draw near‖ 
(Perria, 2015).  
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democratic opening were fundamentally intact. In 2016, Suu Kyi sat down with Obama in the 
Oval Office. Hoping ―the message on democratic reforms had been received in Myanmar,‖ 
Obama lifted U.S. sanctions that had been in place for almost two decades (Dias, 2017).  
―Essentially you were restricting the type of investment that could pull Burma toward the 
international community‖, says Ben Rhodes, President Barack Obama‘s Deputy National 
Security Adviser: ‗We believed that if she and her government were more stable and 
confident in their position, that they would be in a stronger place to take risks on behalf of the 
Rohingya‘‖ (Dias, 2017). Indicative of the mood at the time, in his report to the United 
Nations General Assembly‘s (UNGA) Third Committee on the situation of human rights in 
Myanmar (A/70/332),  
… the Secretary-General invited member states to consider a gradual scaling 
down of the good offices mandate by the end of 2016, as well as other modes of 
engagement thereafter, but there seem to be different views among member 
states on this proposal (Security Council Report, 2016).  
This meant that, in many ways, Antonio Guterres waded into a policy vacuum on Myanmar 
when he was elected last year. The U.N. General Assembly had just terminated the post of 
U.N. special representative to Myanmar, a signal of the international community‘s views that 
Myanmar‘s democratic transition, ―now led by the Nobel Peace Prize-winning leader Aung 
San Suu Kyi‖, was on course and the requirement for ―foreign intervention in the country‘s 
politics had passed‖ (Lynch, 2017). With the onset of the events of 9 October 2016 and the 
establishment of the UN mission, however, the politics of victimhood would grow in direct 
tension with the politics of personality as a source of legitimacy and, by extention, the 
identity of the audience of legitimation would itself become a fundamentally contested 
question.     
3.4 Navigating two competing sources of legitimation: ‘State-sponsored’ 
violence, the establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to 
Myanmar, and the ‘foregrounding’ of the accountability debate  
 … in the current situation, there is no neutral ground on which the conflict can 
be described and judged impartially. And silence is no alternative either, in view 
of the humanitarian disaster. But those expressing their views must be aware 
that they will inevitably become a part of the conflict (Ebbighausen, 2017).      
On 9 October 2016, a group of Rohingya militants, equipped with machetes, attacked 
police stations in northern Rakhine State (nRS), one of the most impoverished states in 
Myanmar, looting and killing nine police officers and injuring another five. In turn, military and 
police targeted and attacked Rohingya armed groups, killing many innocent civilians. . At the 
time, the international community did not only find itself clearly on one side of the ‗peace 
versus justice‘ debate, and fully behind the government position regarding the ‗communal‘ 
50 
 
nature of the ‗Rohingya crisis,‘28 but – as indicated above – gave full support to the Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi government-sponsored ‗Kofi Annan Commission‘. In contrast, however, to 
previously struck political compromises where the politics of personality was the overriding 
legitimation technique, a similar ‗compromise‘ – given the propitious coalescing of at least 
four factors – was not strategically and politically feasible. This brought into sharp focus not 
only the ―Two Faced of the United Nations‘ and the emergence and contestation between 
distinct ‗audiences of legitimation,‘ but the ‗foregrounding of the accountability debate,‘ 
setting the terms for a debate that would lead to the eventual establishment of the UN-
mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar.    
There was increasing international debate and division about the credibility of Aung 
San Suu Kyi in the aftermath of the attacks. Two competing narratives have emerged: ―One 
narrative, used by the central government and military and reflected by ethnic Rakhine 
interviewees, frames the crisis using national security rhetoric‖ (Aron & Gilmore, 2017:4). 
National security discourse has been employed by the central government and the military 
before to frame the Rakhine State conflict, ―focusing on fears of Muslim migration into 
northern Rakhine‖ (2017:5). In the months after the attacks, this language has markedly 
increased. Government statements and government-sponsored media outlets have 
categorized the attacks as ‗terrorist‘ in nature, a framing that validates a heavy-handed 
military response as indispensable to protecting national security and sovereignty: 
Similarly, the government and military have used national security rhetoric to 
respond to international criticism of its handling of the crisis, downplaying abuse 
allegations through both a government-appointed investigatory commission 
headed by former general and current Vice President Myint Swe and through 
national media sources (Aron & Gilmore, 2017:5).   
On the heels of this argument was a scathing legitimacy critique by the Myanmar 
government of the international community, which found expression in its lost report with UN 
Special Rapporteurs, especially Yanghee Lee. The new government of Suu Kyi, ―predicted 
to be an ardent supporter of her mandate‖ (Mathieson, 2018), soon became more 
suspicious. Subsequent to the violence by security forces against Rohingya Muslims in 
Arakan State in October 2016 in the wake of an attack by Rohingya militants, ―that attitude 
turned increasingly to rancor‖ (Mathieson, 2018). The relationship between the State 
Counsellor and the Special Rapporteur soured. The post-August 25, 2017 violence and Suu 
Kyi‘s stubborn refusal to recognize the scale of human suffering ―has terminally severed the 
                                                          
28 Prior to events of 9 October 2016, there was sustained ―emphasis on intercommunal over center-
periphery dimensions to the conflict in international narratives, thereby reinforcing the intercommunal 
divisions locally‖ (Aron & Gilmore, 2017:4).  
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NLD‘s commitment to domestic and international human rights promotion‖ (Mathieson, 
2018).  
Before the UN fact-finding mission, three national commissions were established to 
investigate the 9 October 2016 attacks on border police posts by armed groups and the 
subsequent ‗clearance operations‘ conducted by the Myanmar security forces (Amnesty 
International, 2017:1). On 1 December, President Htin Kyaw established the ―Investigation 
Commission‖ with the mandate to ―probe into the background situations that led to violent 
attacks‖ that occurred on 9 October and 12 and 13 November as well as ―the truth about the 
incidents, and … whether existing laws, rules and regulations were observed‖ (quoted in 
Amnesty International, 2017:1). Although the mandates of the Annan Commission and the 
Investigation Commission are different, ―they nevertheless have some over-lapping aspects, 
which gave rise to some public confusion over the mandates of the respective commissions‖ 
(Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, 2017:16). While the findings of these UN missions 
have been debated and discredited, the debate on the ‗credibility‘ of Aung San Suu Kyi 
brought into sharp focus the two strategic camps of influence. The international community, 
appalled by the events, turned to Suu Kyi, Nobel laureate and titular head of what amounts 
to a dual civilian-military government, to solve the problem or at least denounce the violence 
(Steinberg, 2017). In a controversial address, Aung San Suu Kyi had broken her silence on 
the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar:  
In it, she claimed her government did not ―fear international scrutiny‖ over its 
handling of violence in Rakhine state. But she was criticised for what some saw 
as her ongoing reluctance to address the crisis and the government‘s role in it 
(The Guardian, 2017).  
The locus of the debate has been contestation over the nature of Aung San Suu Kyi‘s 
relationship with the military. While, on the one hand, some social and political 
commentators were more sympathetic, stressing that the newly elected government has 
tough choices, having to settle decades-long ethnic conflicts without upsetting the military 
(Dapice, 2017), others have interrogated the argument – long entrenched in international 
policy and human rights discourses – that lays emphasis on the ―delicate power balance 
between malevolent forces of the military establishment and the benevolent forces of the 
democratically-elected civilian government,‖ some claiming that the threat of a ‗military coup‘ 
is a politically-manufactured myth (Ibrahim, 2018). The High Commissioner of Human 
Rights, Zeid Ra‘ad Al Hussein, would later comment to the BBC that ―She was in a position 
to do something … She could have stayed quiet – or even better, she could have resigned‖ 
(Baynes, 2018). This debate was not limited to scholarly circles, but became a key fault-line 
in the human rights and policy communities:  
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Her unwillingness to speak out against the military crackdown, which came in 
response to insurgent attacks in western Rakhine State, has prompted some 
former admirers to suggest that Suu Kyi be stripped of the Nobel Peace Prize  
she was awarded in 1991 (Nakamura & Gowen, 2017).    
In the aftermath of the events of 9 October 2016, Human rights narratives refocused 
international attention on the central government‘s role in perpetuating the statelessness of 
the Muslim community:  
While international actors interviewed did not contest the security issues at 
stake, the discourse used by many emphasized the impact of military operations 
on the Muslim population within the security zone. Focus has fallen particularly 
on access restrictions which have worsened the humanitarian needs of already-
vulnerable communities, as well as the reported grave human rights violations 
(Aron & Gilmore, 2017:5).    
Aron & Gilmore (2017:5) continue that International narratives have ―provoked backlash 
among government and military actors,‖ who feel that human rights organizations and 
international media have diminished the presence of ―an extremist threat to the country and 
dismissed the military‘s duty to respond to that threat‖. According to Leider (2018:109), by 
―the end of 2017,‖ there seemed to be a prevailing belief among the international community 
that applying pressure on the Myanmar authorities (and especially the military) is the sole 
way to enforce ―the return, the security and the implementation of basic rights for the 
Rohingya‖, while supporting the elected government ―to proceed with the recommendations 
of the Kofi Annan Advisory Commission report‖. ―It looks as if the narrow, normative 
approaches that had dominated Western policies and journalism on Myanmar in pre-2011 
times‖, Leider (2018:109) concludes, ―have been recently tested and are now reset, 
apparently still considered valid despite the country‘s ongoing political changes‖. This has 
not warded off criticism of the Annan Commission.  
While the international community wholeheartedly supported the Rakhine Advisory 
Commission, starting with Aung San Suu Kyi‘s first announcement of its creation, according 
to Liam Mahoney (2018:31), it ―was a mechanism designed by the state, not to resolve the 
Rohingya crisis,‖ but rather ―to deflect the pressures they faced about this crisis‖. ―It served 
that purpose‖, Mahoney stresses, right from the outset: ―the existence of the commission 
gave the international community an oft-repeated excuse to relax all pressure for the entire 
year of its investigation‖ – ―a year in which the government launched the first stage of its 
ethnic cleansing campaign (in October 2016)‖. Rather than speak out between October 2016 
and August 2017,  
… key international players kept saying ―Let‘s wait for the Annan Commission‘s 
report.‖ The Commission‘s work therefore effectively reduced pressure, lowering 
the political cost of the first campaign of attacks, and this arguably may have 
affected the Tatmadaw‘s calculation that it could equally successfully get away 
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with the second ethnic cleansing campaign after August 2017 (Mahoney, 
2018:31). 
Before August 2017, Aung San Suu Kyi was still getting credit from diplomats and analysts 
for establishing the Rakhine Advisory Commission, but the government was under no 
internal political pressure to stop repressing the Rohingya, who have no political allies in 
Myanmar (Mahoney, 2018:31). Instead, there appeared to be a movement towards 
strengthening national and international cooperation.29 Even after full-scale ethnic cleansing, 
―the international community continues to cite the ‗Annan Commission‘s‘ work as if it were a 
sign of hope‖, even once one of the most eminent ―members of the follow-up advisory 
commission, former US diplomat Bill Richardson‖, resigned in objection in January 2018, 
―calling it a ‗whitewash‘‖ (Mahoney, 2018:31).   
Following the events of October 2016, the Flash Report became  
… the latest rallying point for advocacy that periodically surfaces with respect to 
mistreatment of the Rohingya and the instability in Rakhine State. It joins a long 
list of excellent reports by the UN, researchers, and human rights organizations 
which over the decades have raised concerns about crimes against humanity, 
ethnic cleansing, and more recently, genocide being perpetrated against the 
Rohingya (Southwick, 2017:2).  
In early February, a U.N. flash report detailed the alleged atrocities, asserting the ―likely 
commission of crimes against humanity‖ (OHCHR, 2017a). The High Commissioner 
commissioned a OHCHR four-member team and requested access to Bangladesh from 8 to 
23 January to interview Rohingyas who had entered Bangladesh from northern Rakhine 
State (nRS) in the aftermath of the 9 October 2016 attacks (OHCHR, 2017a). The 
teamconcentrated exclusively on collecting testimonies on events and incidents that had 
occurred in nRS since 9 October with a view to carrying out an assessment of potential 
human rights violations (OHCHR, 2017a).  
Given the scale of the exodus, the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres spoke out, 
and his use of the term ‗ethnic cleansing‘ cleared the path for many others to finally apply 
this name to the problem (Mahoney, 2018:21). Some scholars have interrogated the politics 
behind the ‗ethnic cleansing‘ designation, which can be contrasted with the politics 
underlying the ‗genocide‘ label (Khan, 2017). Calls for a U.S. determination of ‗ethnic 
cleansing‘ had intensified, ―as the United Nations and leading Western governments have 
used the term‖ (Pennington, 2017). U.N. human rights chief Zeid Ra‘ad al-Hussein said it 
―seems a textbook example of ethnic cleansing‖ (quoted in Pennington, 2017), while French 
President Emmanuel Macron echoed that opinion, as have leaders of many in the Muslim 
world‖ (Pennington, 2017). The newly-elected Secretary General also reappointed a UN 
                                                          
29 In 2018, the Good Offices mandate would be renewed (Pedersen, 2018).  
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special envoy. The formal mandate of the new envoy is at first glance different from that of 
her predecessors:  
While earlier UN resolutions contained a long list of concerns headed by 
demands for the military to respect the democratic will of the people, the most 
recent one is overwhelmingly focused on the Rohingya refugee crisis for which 
the new democratically elected government is widely seen to share responsibility 
(Pederson, 2018).    
While not absolute,30 these events suggested a ‗political shift‘ in the UN headquarters 
towards an activist role with regards to the Rohingya crisis. The ―ethnic cleansing‖ 
characterization had already been clearly voiced by High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(United Nations, 2017). Amid increased international attention in the wake of the publication 
of the UN Flash report, two internal commissions – one military and one police – were 
established to investigate possible wrongdoing. According to state media, both commissions 
were established at the request of the Investigation Commission. Both commissions had the 
mandate to establish whether the military or the police had committed illegal actions 
―including violations of human rights‖ during the ―clearance operations‖ (Amnesty 
International, 2017:2). In a public statement by Amnesty International, the international 
human rights group states that  
… none of the commissions established by the authorities are independent, 
impartial, effective or credible (Amnesty International, 2017:1).   
In early 2017, a rare meeting between the State Counsellor and the Commander in 
Chief took place the day after the release of the OHCHR report: ―the military announcement 
to form a commission to investigate the allegations came soon thereafter‖ (Aron & Gilmore, 
2017:14). A number of weeks later, the National Security Adviser declared the formal closure 
of operations in northern Rakhine and a handover of control to police forces: ―This 
announcement preceded consideration of the situation in Myanmar at the UN Human Rights 
Council in March 2017, which included in its agenda discussions on the situation in northern 
Rakhine‖ (Aron & Gilmore, 2017:14). Apart from the OHCHR report, a simultaneous report – 
by the Special Rapporteur Yang Lee (UNHRC, 2017) – prompted a discussion and 
resolution in the UN Human Rights Commission to discuss proposals of a formal 
Commission of Inquiry and eventually decide on launching an official fact-finding mission. 
                                                          
30 In The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights‟ fears on Myanmar‟s shrinking political space 
Morgane Dussud (2018) analyzes the High Commissioner‘s announcement that he will not seek a 
second mandate: ―The High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra‘ad al-Hussein announced on 
December 20, 2017 that he wouldn‘t be seeking a second mandate, due to the ―appalling climate for 
advocacy‖ in the current geopolitical system. This comes as a worrying warning regarding the inability 
of the UN system to respond to multiplying conflicts across the globe, from Syria to Yemen, and from 




The call for a Commission of Inquiry or other similar international investigation mechanisms 
was also supported by national and international human rights organisations, including 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW), as well as by the Arakan Project.  
A pivotal aspect of this theoretical stage, however, has been the ongoing debate about 
the culpability – and credibility – of Aung San Suu Kyi.  In an article entitled Will the 
Rohingya Exodus Be Aung San Suu Kyi's Fall From Grace?¸Elizabeth Dias highlights that 
this: 
… is how icons fall. The U.S. had championed Suu Kyi not just as the great 
savior of her country but also as the model of nonviolent disobedience in 
Southeast Asia. The U.N. had expressed expectations for Burma, as Myanmar 
was long known, under her leadership. Now she has revealed different priorities. 
―She sees herself very deliberately now as a political actor inside of a changing 
Burma, not as an icon that essentially speaks out on human rights,‖ says Ben 
Rhodes, President Barack Obama‘s Deputy National Security Adviser. ‗Her 
single-minded pursuit of that objective of political reform inside of Burma has 
created a very glaring and tragic blind spot‘ (Dias, 2017).  
In Congress, a variety of reactions are on display: ―Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell, 
who has championed Suu Kyi for decades, called her the week before her speech as public 
pressure on her rose‖ (Dias, 2017).  He then defended her to the Senate: ―She is the same 
person she was before,‖ he said, continuing that she ―is trying to improve conditions‖ (Dias, 
2017). Senator John McCain of Arizona wrote her a letter, asking her to reverse her decision 
denying U.N. Human Rights Council access to northern Rakhine (Dias, 2017). McCain and 
others also struck language from the National Defense Authorization Act that would have 
increased U.S. military-to-military engagements with Myanmar‘s army. Senator Dianne 
Feinstein of California, who participated in Suu Kyi‘s Congressional Gold Medal ceremony in 
2012, wants Congress to re-evaluate its relationship with the army and Suu Kyi‘s 
government:  
At the very least, the leaders who planned and executed this campaign of ethnic 
cleansing should be sanctioned, all military-to-military contact should be 
suspended, and preferential trade benefits with Burma should be ended (quoted 
in Dias, 2017).  
Given how the person Aung San Suu Kyi has become so integrally linked to international 
responses to Myanmar and, particularly, the Rohingya crisis, it is unsurprising that 
international criticism of Aung San Suu Kyi soon refracted onto the international community.     
On 15 March 2017, HRW published an article entitled EU Risks Complicity in Crimes 
Against Rohingya in which international human rights organization‘s Philippe Bolopion 
(2017) stresses that ―Burma is spiralling into violence once again,‖ and as the former military 
dictatorship engages in another wave of mass atrocities, ―the European Union has become 
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suddenly shy at the diplomatic wheel‖. Unless it takes action, ―the bloc‘s hands-off approach 
risks rolling back hard-won progress and fostering extremist violence‖ (Bolopian, 2017). In 
one ―dramatic critique‖ of the United Nations‘ dominant approach, a collection of INGO 
country directors who had previously worked as country directors in Sri Lanka during the end 
of its civil war wrote a closed letter to Kofi Annan in November 2016, ―copied to selected 
diplomatic and UN leadership‖ (Mahoney, 2018:24). The letter drew attention to the 
distressing parallels between the Sri Lanka debacle and the warning signs present in 
Myanmar:  
The letter spoke of the urgent need to avert a crisis of atrocity, calling attention to 
the risk of war crimes against civilians trapped in the middle of security 
operations, not only in northern Rakhine but also in Kachin and Shan states 
(Mahoney, 2018:24).   
Subsequently, a confidential presentation by the same authors to the Rakhine Heads of 
Missions (HOMs) group went in to ―greater detail about the preconditions and crisis points‖ 
resulting in mass atrocities that were ―all in evidence already in Myanmar‖, and the necessity 
to immediately recalibrate the United Nations‘ approach (Mahoney, 2018:24).31 The 
response of the Resident Coordinator and the HOMs group was to ―resist and silence this 
message‖, and maintain their ―dominant quiet track‖ in spite of ―all evidence of its failure‖ 
(Mahoney, 2018:24). Be that as it may, the INGO directors also still sustained ―the quiet 
approach, and did not share their letter more widely‖ (Mahoney, 2018:24). The humanitarian 
coordinator / UN resident would later be dismissed by the newly appointed Secretary-
General.32  
On 24 March 2017, the European Union, supported by the United States, the United 
Kingdom and other countries, sponsored a two-pronged UNHRC-adopted resolution 
(A/HRC/34/L.8/Rev.1) which mandates an international fact-finding mission to establish facts 
on violations, especially in Rakhine State. Firstly, the UNHRC  established an independent 
international fact-finding mission (FFM) appointed by the UNHRC‘s President to investigate 
―the alleged recent human rights violations by military and security forces, and abuses, in 
Myanmar, in particular in Rakhine State‖ (quoted in Kaufman, 2018:5). The resolution 
                                                          
31 The Heads of Missions (HOMs) Rakhine initiative was a group of ―selected ambassadors, certain 
heads of UN agencies and a few INGO representatives. This emerged as an influential advisory 
group ostensibly aimed at providing some leadership and coordination to the overall international 
approach to Rakhine State‖ (Mahoney, 2018:22).   
32 In Is the U.N. Ready for the „Asian Century‟? The Rohingya Crisis Suggests Not, Richard Gowan 
(2017) ―new Secretary-General Antonio Guterres appears to have taken office convinced that the 
U.N. needed to reboot its political approach to Myanmar. This summer, the U.N. announced that its 
top official in the country, Renata Lok-Dessallien, would move on after reports of her ―glaringly 
dysfunctional‖ setup went public. In the byzantine world of senior U.N. appointments, this is the 




requested an update at its thirty-sixth session (in September 2017) and a full report at its 
thirty-seventh session (in March 2018) (Kaufman, 2018:5). Secondly, the UNHRC re-
mandate the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, first 
established in 1992 and extended yearly. Through this resolution, the UNHRC appealed to 
the Myanmar government to cooperate with both the the Special Rapporteur and the FFM 
(Kaufman, 2018:5).   
Three factors, namely, 1. increasing international debate and division over the 
‗authority‘ of Aung San Suu Kyi; 2. a political shift within the UN headquarters towards an 
activist role; and 3. a critique of the United Nations‘ dominant approach in Myanmar, 
triggered a fourth, namely, 4. the contestation over the identity of the ‗audiences of 
legitimation.‘ . This is most aptly illustrated by the establishment of the UN-mandate fact-
finding mission to Myanmar, which ‗reflects‘ the complexity of Myanmar‘s strategic context, 
characterised by the contestation, navigation and co-optation of these now competing 
sources of legitimacy.      
3.5 Myanmar’s strategic context and the (re)legitimising role(s) of the UN-
mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar 
In a telephone interview with Al Jazeera, Indira Jaising stressed that minorities the 
world over "are facing persecution. The situation of the Rohingya community in Myanmar is 
especially deplorable because they face the risk of a genocide‖. She concluded, stressing 
the hope that the UN Mission‘s "recommendations will make an impact and awaken the 
conscience of the international community" (Al Jazeera, 2017). While the key ‗audience of 
legitimation‘ is the ‗Rohingya movement‘, the identity of the audience of legitimation is 
ultimately itself a contested question, significantly within the United Nations. On 27 July 
2017, the United Nations released a statement underlining the replacement of Indira Jaising 
by Marzuki Darusman as Chair of Myanmar Fact-finding Mission (OHCHR, 2017d).  It 
continues that the ―Mission members will be meeting in Geneva in August to discuss the 
approach they will employ in discharging their mandate‖, concluding, as ―in all such cases, 
the Mission will make it a priority to reach out to and engage constructively with the 
Government and other relevant interlocutors‖ (OHCHR, 2017d). The statement did not give 
reasons for the replacement. But ‗rumours‘ are that her statements made the UN mission 
vulnerable to ‗perceived bias‘ (Lewis, 2017). According to Bexell & Jonsson (2018:131-132), 
however, the 
… emergence of self-appointed audiences is facilitated by a mediatized public 
sphere that provides the information needed for groups beyond constituencies to 
engage in legitimation or delegitimation on GGIs … The public availability of 
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information on GGIs clearly plays a key role in the formation of self-appointed 
audiences in legitimation processes.   
A challenge to the prevailing strategic context, Jaising‘s dismissal would suggest that 
her comments were contrary to the political consensus that underpins the fact-finding 
mission mandate, which navigates two regimes of legitimation. This line of argument, 
however, raises a series of counter-arguments which will be explored in the discussion 
below. Firstly, how can the UN mission have challenged the political consensus underling 
the UN mandated fact-finding mission when a slew of United Nations, European actors and 
the US, among the key mandating entities of the UN mission, have themselves labelled the 
crisis as ‗ethnic cleansing‘? Secondly, if the politics of the ‗ethnic cleansing versus genocide‘ 
designation comes into play, can it still be claimed that the key audience of legitimation is the 
‗Rohinga‘ movement, given that the UN mission can then be characterised more so as a 
‗symbolic‘ structure, in which it risks, like arguably the Annan Commission, ―resembling what 
legal sociologist Lauren Edelman calls ‗symbolic structures‘, giving the illusion of compliance 
while limiting the actual realization of human rights‖ (Southwick, 2017: 2-3)?     
The UN resolution which gives effect to the UN-mandated fact-finding mission has 
various audiences and political stakeholders in mind. Perhaps most saliently, it addresses 
the concerns of the cross-section of stakeholders who have rallied behind the call for an 
internationally-mandated fact-finding mission.33 Moreover, apart from taking ―note of the 
general observations of Myanmar on the report of the Special Rapporteur submitted to the 
Council at its thirty-fourth session,‖ it recalls:  
the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in 
Myanmar[…] and the recommendations contained therein, and the flash report of 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights of 3 
February 2017, entitled ―Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar since 9 
October 2016‖, prepared following a mission to Bangladesh (UNHRC, 2017).     
Be that as it may, the UN resolution‘s ‗accountability turn‘ has been couched in a 
‗peacebuilding framework,‘ the key political stakeholder being the Myanmar government.   
In this regard, apart from the need for the Myanmar government to cooperate with the 
UN mission, the UN resolution also highlights – and affirms – other aspects of national and 
international cross cooperation and on-going negotiation. For example, the UN resolution 
recognises ―the positive developments in Myanmar towards political and economic reform, 
                                                          
33 In a Joint Letter to Governments on the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Burma, a group of human 
rights organizations asserted that the Fact-Finding Mission is ―in the interests of the government of 
Myanmar‖ and ―the people of the country‖ since it would signal ―the government‘s willingness to 
uphold the rule of law, work collaboratively with the international community to help establish the 
facts, identify perpetrators, and deter future crimes by all parties to the conflict‖ (Human Rights Watch, 
2017a).   
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democratization, national reconciliation, good governance and the rule of law‖ and ―the 
efforts made to promote and protect human rights and combat corruption‖, and encouraging 
the Government ―to take further steps to address outstanding concerns‖ (UNHRC, 2017).    
Furthermore, it commends the Myanmar government for ―the formation of a democratically 
elected government,‖ while calling upon ―all actors to consolidate the democratic transition 
with full respect for ―the rule of law and human rights by bringing all national institutions, 
including the military, under civilian control,‖ and ―to ensure the inclusion of all ethnic and 
religious minorities in the political process‖ (UNHRC, 2017). Given the complex interplay 
between national and international fact-finding,34 a key area of international cross-
cooperation highlighted in the UN resolution is the so-called ‗Annan Commission‘.  
The UN resolution has been seen in the context of the so-called ‗Kofi Annan 
Commission.‘ Charles Petrie, a former UN resident coordinator in Myanmar, recognised that 
the probabilities of investigators gaining right of entry were ―pretty slim‖ (quoted in Perria, 
2017). It could, nevertheless, increase the possibilities of Myanmar‘s government 
implementing the Advisory Commission on Rakhine‘s recommendations: 
The Geneva resolution should be seen in the context of Annan‘s interim report 
released on 16 March, Petrie said, describing them as ‗closely linked‘… ‗So, right 
now, the best-case scenario is that they will focus on one [Annan] to try and 
defuse the other [Geneva],‘ said Petrie (Perria, 2017).  
As an area of ongoing national and international cross cooperation and negotiation, the UN 
resolution recognises the Myanmar government‘s ―initial steps … to address the underlying 
causes of the situation in Rakhine State,‖ including by establishing ―the Central Committee 
for the Implementation of Peace, Stability and Development in Rakhine State‖ and ―the 
Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, established on 5 September 2016 at the behest of 
the State Counsellor of Myanmar, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and chaired by former Secretary-
General Kofi Annan,‖ and ―commencing work on a long-term socioeconomic development 
plan for Rakhine State‖ (UNHRC, 2017). 35 Petrie‘s assessment, however, backgrounds 
other aspects of Myanmar‘s strategic context, the need for a more fine-grained 
problematique which embeds the UN fact-finding mission in a broader set of political 
                                                          
34 In The Transformation of Human Rights Fact-finding, Knuckey and Alston illustrate the complex 
interplay between domestic and international fact-finding initiatives. Regarding the interplay between 
international and domestic fact-finding, Alston & Knuckey (2016:9) highlight that ―it would be a 
mistake to think that these two different levels of fact-finding are separate from one another. In 
practice, there is a complex interplay between the international and domestic, and the standards and 
approaches that are adopted at one level inevitably influence those used at the other‖.  
35 The UN resolution also ―the concurrence of the Government of Myanmar with the recommendations 
of the interim report of the Advisory Commission made public on 16 March 2017, and looks forward to 
their prompt implementation for stability, peace and prosperity in Rakhine State, in full consultation 
with all the communities concerned‖ (UNHRC, 2017).  
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relations and within-case dynamics, and the ways in which the UN mission re-instates long-
standing political compromises.    
On 19 September 2017, the Human Rights Council held an interactive dialogue with 
the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar after it had heard an oral 
update by Marzuki Darusman, Chairperson of the Fact-Finding Mission. However, ―while 
multistakeholder dialogues are enveloped in narratives of inclusion, in practice they are often 
only accessible to those in positions of structural power‖ (Bexell & Jonsson, 2018:129). In 
this vein, Carl Death (2011) sees ‗political theatre‘ at play at global summits, where 
‗consultations‘ aim to persuade global audiences that political elites are responding to 
citizens. Extending the theatre metaphor, in global governance the ‗frontstage‘ may be open 
to public view, but ‗backstage‘ power disparities are less transparent‖ (Bexell & Jonsson, 
2018:129). At the conference, Darusman suggested that the 
… Fact-Finding Mission was looking ahead towards producing a report which 
would be complementary to that report, as the Annan report was not mandated 
to look into specific human rights violations.  The Fact-Finding Mission would be 
undertaking a more specific mandate in that regard (OHCHR, 2017e).  
While these statements bear out Knuckey & Alston‘s contention that the standards and 
approaches that are adopted at one level inevitably influence those used at the other, a 
conference hosted by the EU Commission suggests that that Myanmar‘s changing evolving 
strategic context does not only play a constitutive role in terms of the establishment of the 
UN mission, but the UN mission challenges this strategic context while re-inscribing various 
political compromises. In Burma, EU at Odds Over UN Fact-finding Mission, Reuters  quotes 
the EU‘s top diplomat Federica Mogherini at a news conference who described the fact-
finding mission as ―focusing on establishing the truth about the past‖ (quoted in Reuters, 
2017). Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said that she would only endorse the recommendations from 
a ‗separate advisory commission‘ headed by former UN chief Kofi Annan, adding – while 
stressing the inter-communal nature of the crisis – that the UN-established fact-finding 
mission would ‗divide‘ communities (Reuters, 2017).  Asked about the move, Daw Aung San 
Suu Kyi said:  
We are dissociating ourselves from the resolution because we don‘t think the 
resolution is in keeping with what is actually happening on the ground (quoted in 
Reuters, 2017). 
In contrast, however, by the end of the interview, Mogherini called the ‗Annan 
Commission‘ the ‗roadmap‘ and the ‗way forward‘ (Moulin, 2017), not only pre-judging the 
relationship between the Annan Commission and the UN mission, but constructing an 
implicit hierarchy and a relationship of subordination between these two separate entities. In 
terms of the underlying political calculus, Bhatia sums it up best when she says that 
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democratic governments are ―too invested in Aung San Suu Kyi and the country‘s progress 
to date to press her much harder‖, fearing repercussions against ―both themselves and their 
values‖ (Bhatia, 2017). The significance of an incumbent ―who is inclined to uphold 
democratic principles‖, even if only when it is politically convenient, is assumed to ―outweigh 
the damage done by the persecution of the Rohingya‖ (Bhatia, 2017). In the context, 
Darusman‘s comments can be understood as an effort ―to conform to the dictates of 
preexisting audiences‖ (Suchman, 1995:587), for example, regional blocs (i.e. the EU), 
within the United Nations‘ current strategic environment. In the final analysis, the 
establishment of the UN mission ‗reflects‘ the complexity of Myanmar‘s evolving strategic 
context, characterised by the navigation, contestation and the co-optation of competing 
sources of legitimacy. In Chapter 4, I conclude by discussing the threefold value of my 
findings and raising critical questions about Myanmar‘s strategic context, the UN-mandated 
fact-finding mission to Myanmar, and the contested question of the ‗audiences of 



















4.1 General remarks 
The value of this research study is threefold.  Firstly, it throws light on the dynamic 
interplay between domestic and international fact-finding and the political – and strategic – 
context in which they are established. Secondly, it interrogates the politics behind the 
establishment of UN-mandated fact-finding missions. And thirdly, this research study brigns 
into intense relief t the politics of the ‗here and now‘ and the contingencies of within-case 
dynamics that underlie the establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to 
Myanmar. Be that as it may, this research raises critical questions concerning the theoretical 
framework employed in this research study by highlighting more ad hoc, case-specific 
explanations for finding the evidence. There are other distinct strategic dynamics which 
arguably confound, but also influence, the political dynamics of Myanmar‘s strategic context 
which are the empirical focus of this research study. Furthermore, apart from those alleged 
in this research study, there are various other rationales for why the genocide-claim was 
possibly used by the former Chairperson of the UN mandated fact-finding mission to 
Myanmar. Finally, subsequent UN framings of the UN mission as complementary to the so-
called ‗Annan Commission‘ need not necessarily be read in the context of the contested 
nature of the identity of ‗audiences of legitimation‘.  
4.2 Theoretical value of the dynamic view of international fact-finding 
Firstly, drawing on Megret‗s (2016) dynamic conception of international human rights 
fact-finding, this research study reveals the dynamic interplay between domestic and 
international fact-finding and the political – and strategic – context in which they are 
established. To this end, I traced the emergence of the politics of personality as a central 
legitimation technique which has structured international engagement. By the time 
Myanmar‗s 2011 democratic opening arrived, there was a ‗backgrounding‘ of the 
accountability debate discussion about Myanmar‗s ‗democratic‘ transition, facilitated by the 
intervention of Aung San Suu Kyi. This was most clearly illustrated by the debate on the 
International Commission of Inquiry prior to Myanmar‗s 2011 democratic opening. Next, I 
examined the emergence of the politics of Rohingya victimhood as a source of legitimacy, 
which challenged established scholarly, human rights and political orthodoxies regarding the 
‗Rohingya issue.‘ In 2012, with the outbreak of ‗inter-communal‘ violence in Myanmar, the 
‗backgrounding‘ of accountability increasingly turned into a policy of ‗deflection‗.  
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With the election of Myanmar‗s first civilian-base government, the Annan Commission 
represented an attempt by the Myanmar government, but especially Aung San Suu Kyi, not 
only to deflect growing criticism, but to persuade key powerbrokers within the United Nations 
architecture itself. Nevertheless, the onset of intercommunal violence marked the creeping 
political influence of transnationalism. In part three, I brought into sharp focus how 
Myanmar‗s evolving strategic context – characterised by two competing sources of 
legitimation – had played a constitutive role in the establishment of the UN-mandated fact-
finding mission, the empirical focus of this research study. In the aftermath of the events of 9 
October 2016, underscored by the establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to 
Myanmar, the accountability debate was, once again, ‗foregrounded.‘ In the final analysis, 
the establishment of the UN mission ‗reflects‘ the complexity of Myanmar‗s evolving strategic 
context, characterised by the navigation, contestation and the co-optation of competing 
sources of legitimacy.    
Secondly, this research study, in light of scholarly literature on legitimacy in global 
governance, has interrogated the politics behind the establishment of UN-mandated fact-
finding missions. In Legitimacy in global governance, Magdalena Bexell and Kristina 
Jonsson (2018:119) draw attention to actors who are at the receiving end of legitimation and 
(de)legitimation efforts, namely, the audiences, ―a set of actors who hold or withhold 
legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis GGIs‖. Echoing Bexell & Jonsson (2018:120), what this research 
has argued is that ―audiences do not exist a priori, but they are constituted either by being 
targeted by GGIs or by being self-appointed‖. By way of argument, this research study has 
systematically examined the politics of personality and of Rohingya victimhood, and the 
various types of ‗audiences of legitimation‘ to which they gave rise, which feature centrally in 
the establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar.  
In as much as Aung San Suu Kyi was key to legitimating the Myanmar government in the 
eyes of the international community, the politics of personality legitimised the international 
community‘s peace-building aspirations, which included a host of targeted ‗audiences,‘ with 
Norway playing the leading role. The international community‘s legitimation processes took 
on a new quality with the rise of a new front of international Rohingya caretakers. In contrast 
to the ‗targeted audiences,‘ ‗constructed‘ by international efforts peacebuilding efforts, these 
‗audiences‘ are characterised as ‗self-appointed‘, even though they have acquired increased 
political-institutional bonds to the UN itself. While there was rising and pointed criticism of 
Aung San Suu Kyi and her civilian-based government in light of the ‗Rohingya crisis,‘ the 
legitimising beliefs in train since the 2011 democratic opening remained fundamentally intact 
until the 2016 State-sponsored violence.  
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Thirdly, this research study, bringing together these two branches of scholarly 
literature,‘ focuses on the politics of the ‗here and now‘ and the contingencies of within-case 
dynamics that underlie the establishment of the UN-mandated fact-finding mission to 
Myanmar. It is to the underlying three-pronged argument of this line of inquiry to which I now 
turn and critically analyse.  
4.3 Legitimacy struggles and other features of Myanmar’s strategic context 
This research study has endeavoured to demonstrate how the UN resolution, 
underpinned by various institutional and discursive processes, brings into sharp focus 
international efforts to navigate two competing ‗audiences of legitimation.‘ This is brought 
most manifestly to the fore, among others, by the establishment of the UN fact-finding 
mission and the broader political context of national and regional cross-cooperation as 
manifest by the UN resolution. However, there are other distinct strategic dynamics, borne 
out by the UN resolution, which arguably confound, but also influence, the political dynamics 
of Myanmar‘s strategic context which are the empirical focus of this research study. Apart 
from expanding accountability relations, there are other factors underlying Myanmar‘s 
strategic context that have an equal bearing upon the establishment of the UN fact-finding 
mission to Myanmar. A strong case can be made that the political consensus that underpins 
this draft resolution takes account of other intergovernmental dynamics in Myanmar‘s 
strategic context apart from those emphasized in this research context. This includes the 
broad consensus that allegedly underpins the UN resolution: 
In recognition of the broad consensus behind the measure, the Council adopted 
the resolution without a vote. Myanmar and several other countries – the 
Philippines, India, China, and Venezuela – dissociated themselves from the 
resolution. While Japan did not support the creation of the Fact-Finding Mission, 
it nonetheless welcomed the adoption of the resolution by consensus and 
expressed regret that Myanmar had dissociated itself from that consensus 
(Human Rights Watch, 2017).   
 A further dynamic ought to be taken into account: the political problem of accountability. In 
The Political Dimension of International Human Rights Fact-Finding, Steven R. Ratner 
(2013:70) argues that while much of ―the backlash against human rights fact-finding is 
significant‖ and can and should be resolved by the fact-finding bodies themselves by means 
of ―rigorous methodologies and a careful statement and application of the standard of proof‖, 
the actual aversion to and origin of complaints about fact-finding bodies is ―fundamentally 
political – an aversion by state and some nonstate actors to accountability itself‖. The 
proposal for a Commission of Inquiry in the original draft of the resolution was objected to by 
Myanmar itself. There are various possible reasons for this. According to the New York 
Times‘ Nick Cumming-Bruce (2017) indicates that the resolution gives effect to ―a fact-
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finding mission, not a commission of inquiry — a change made by the measure‘s sponsors, 
which include the United States, after Myanmar objected to the original language‖.  
Another key dimension is the politics of the UN Security Council. In The Prospects, 
Problems and Proliferation of Recent UN Investigations of International Law Violations, 
Zachary D Kaufman (2018:10) has highlighted that initiatives by the UNGA or the UNHRC 
cannot be vetoed, ―enabling those institutions to be viable sponsors of investigations in 
Syria, Myanmar, Burundi, and Yemen‖.36 Kaufman (2018:14) has asked whether the 
category of UN fact-finding, in the context of Myanmar, can ―still hold value for the genuine 
pursuit of justice or are they feeble fallbacks in the absence of international consensus 
through the UNSC?‖ While these distinct strategic dynamics, borne out by the UN resolution, 
arguably supersede the political dynamics of Myanmar‘s strategic context which are the 
empirical focus of this research study, other aspects of the establishment of the UN mission 
give additional weight to the argument advanced in this research context.  
4.4 The identity of the audiences of legitimation as a contested question 
In this regard, this research study has also argued that the establishment of the UN 
mission included discursive and institutional efforts to position the politics of Rohinga 
victimhood as the key legitimising strategy, thus targeting the ‗Rohingya caretakers‘ as the 
key ‗audience of legitimation.‘ This was most clearly illustrated by the appointment of the 
fact-finders, Indira Jaising‘s genocide claim and, by implication, the UN mission‘s direct 
challenge to the Annan Commission. During the course of this research study, however, two 
key considerations have been whether the HRUF has truly engaged with civil society, 
including Rohingya Caretakers. Furthermore, this raises concerns as to whether UN human 
rights activities, including the establishment of the UN mission, both highlights and helps 
resolve accountability deficits. Apart from these concerns, there are various other rationales 
for why the genocide-claim was possibly used by the former Chairperson of the UN 
mandated fact-finding mission to Myanmar. What is notable about the election of Indira 
Jaising as Chairperson of the UN mission is her track record for legal activism. Jaising‘s 
genocide claim, however, needn‘t be assessed in the context of the politics of Rohingya 
victimhood and its ‗audiences of legitimation.‘   There are, nevertheless, also various other 
rationales for why Jaising could have adopted an activist posture.  
Rob Grace (2015:57) unpacks the various rationales that underscore the decision by fact-
finders to engage in activism, among others, arguing that ―the act of assisting people in 
                                                          
36 ―Perhaps if the UNSC, with its enforcement capability, had sponsored the investigative bodies for 
Burundi and Myanmar instead of the UNHRC, then those two states would not have blocked UN 
investigators from entering‖ (Kaufman, 2017:11).   
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need, regardless of the mandate‘s authority, has a strong normative pull that is often 
congruent with the mandate‘s aims‖. Furthermore, in addition to the strong normative pull of 
assisting people in need, there is also the contention that there is no watertight distinction 
between expertise and activism. In International Judges and Experts‟ Impartiality and the 
Problem of Past Declarations, Frederic Megret (2011:61) also unpicks the various 
motivations that underscore the choice to engage in activism, stressing that the ―line 
between expertise and activism, particularly in the law, and even more so in a normatively 
dense subject like international law or human rights, can be a thin one‖. It is the contention of 
this research study, however, that Jaising‘s genocide-claim, an implicit challenge to the 
Rakhine Advisory Commission, need to be interpreted in conjunction with the appointment of 
a new Chairperson and the newly-appointed Chairperson‘s (i.e. Marzuki Darusman) framing 
of the UN fact-finding mission. 
In this connection, the dismissal of Indira Jaising and Marzuki Darusman‘s framing of 
the UN mission as ‗complementary‘ to the Annan Commission seek to re-position the politics 
of personality as the key legitimising strategy. The dismissal of Indira Jaising does not 
necessarily, however, have to be read in the context of the contested character of the 
identity of the ‗audiences of legitimation‘. According to Rob Grace (2014:59), determining 
whether to engage in activism falls into the ―category of dilemmas‖ – alongside, for example, 
deciding to use legal lenses not overtly stipulated in the mandate – that are ―hotly debated 
among practitioners and states‖. According to Megret (2016:39), the  
striving to be impartial may be in tension with the … problematic tendency to 
sometimes want to elect ‗champions‘ of a particular cause with a long track 
record of writing and opining on the issue they are asked to investigate.  
Furthermore, as highlighted in the literature review, among the ways to respond to the 
problems with national-level COIs is to insist that international fact-finding be undertaken, 
either in place of, or as a complement to, domestic initiatives. In this context, Darusman‘s 
framing of the UN mission can also be understood as a case study on the complex interplay 
between domestic and international fact-finding. To quote Knuckey & Alston (2016:9), it is 
not uncommon that ―the standards and approaches that are adopted at one level inevitably 
influence those used at the other‖. This sometimes very dynamic interplay is well-illustrated 
by the case of Myanmar. Not only have four (widely discredited) domestic fact-finding 
missions been established in relation to international fact-finding efforts, but the UN mission 
has implicitly challenged the ‗Annan Commission,‘ only later to be dubbed by the newly-
appointed Chairperson as a ‗complement‘ to the ‗Annan Commission‘. However, against the 
backdrop of Myanmar‘s evolving strategic context, the central contention of this research 
study is that the key political problem at issue in the establishment of the UN mission is that 
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the identity of the ‗audiences of legitimation‘ is itself a contested question, reflecting a 
broader tension between intergovernmentalism and transnationalism, two forces that 
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